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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, new measurement techniques have provided opportunities to 
improve the North American Power System observability, control and protection.  
This dissertation discusses the formulation and design of a special protection 
scheme based on a novel utilization of trajectory sensitivity techniques with inputs 
consisting of system state variables and parameters. Trajectory sensitivity analysis (TSA) 
has been used in previous publications as a method for power system security and 
stability assessment, and the mathematical formulation of TSA lends itself well to some 
of the time domain power system simulation techniques.  
Existing special protection schemes often have limited sets of goals and control 
actions. The proposed scheme aims to maintain stability while using as many control 
actions as possible. 
The approach here will use the TSA in a novel way by using the sensitivities of 
system state variables with respect to state parameter variations to determine the state 
parameter controls required to achieve the desired state variable movements. The initial 
application will operate based on the assumption that the modeled power system has full 
system observability, and practical considerations will be discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation discusses the formulation and design of a special protection 
scheme based on a novel utilization of trajectory sensitivity techniques with power 
system state variables and physical model data as the main inputs. The work for the 
dissertation includes the formulation of the special protection scheme, the mathematical 
analysis leading up to the scheme design, and testing of the scheme using software 
simulation. In this introductory chapter, the research motivations and objectives, a brief 
review of relevant literature, the contributions of the dissertation, and the outline of the 
overall dissertation will be discussed. 
1.1 Research Motivations and Objectives 
 The objective of this dissertation is to develop a special protection scheme for 
wide-area power systems, concentrating on the transmission level of the system. The 
special protection scheme will be designed to use power system state variables, and 
system data as inputs and utilize trajectory sensitivity analysis techniques to drive the 
protective and control actions. 
 Special protection schemes are different from conventional protection schemes. 
These schemes are designed to analyze the system state measurements and state estimates 
in order to determine whether the system is moving towards an unstable or unacceptable 
state and then take preventive actions. Instead of simply disconnecting equipment or 
switching some of the equipment, the special protection scheme is designed to evaluate 
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what protective and control actions are available and initiate the actions that have the 
most positive impact on the system state variables. 
 The state variables that are being evaluated and controlled include voltage and 
current magnitudes and angles, machine shaft speeds, and internal variables for the 
dynamic models of the power system components. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
the variables are imported from a time-domain simulation in a MATLAB environment. 
From a practical standpoint, some of the required data are available from synchrophasor 
outputs and the remainder can be derived using pseudo-measurements. These may 
include imported external device measurements, breaker status flags that can be used to 
determine changes to system topology, or equipment warning flags to detect overloading 
in key lines or transformers. The circuit topology and system equipment parameters such 
as machine inertia, exciter characteristics, etc., are also part of the input that will have to 
be available in order for the special protection scheme to evaluate the system trajectory 
correctly. 
 After the special protection scheme design is tested in software simulation, the 
scheme performance will be reviewed with considerations for the practical case where 
measurements are available from PMUs, but not at every bus on the system. Afterwards, 
a methodology is suggested for modifying the simulated case for application in an actual 
power system where perfect measurements cannot be assumed. 
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1.2 Brief Review of Topics Covered and Relevant Literature 
1.2.1 Power System Dynamic Modeling 
The simulations performed for this dissertation are done in a MATLAB 
environment, specifically utilizing the open-source PSAT toolbox [1]. All of the models 
and corresponding variables used are defined in the toolbox manual [1]. A summary of 
the models is shown below to clearly illustrate the calculation requirements. 
Synchronous Machines 
Synchronous machines are modeled as a sixth-order dynamic model. The 
differential and algebraic equations used in [1] follow the modeling equations in [2] 
which have the following state (xsync) and algebraic (ysync) variables. 
   ' ' " ", , , , ,sync q d q dx e e e ed ω=                          (1) 
   [ ], ,sync m e ey p p q=                                     (2) 
Where  
δ  Shaft angle of rotation 
ω  Rate of rotation, per-unit 
e’d,e’q,   Voltages behind transient reactances for d and q axes 
e”d,e”q  Voltages behind sub-transient reactances  
pm  Mechanical power input for the machine 
pe,qe  Electrical active (p) and reactive (q) power  
The dynamic equations that model the behavior of the synchronous machine and 
the algebraic equations that model the machine terminal conditions as well as the other 
system parameters are shown in Chapter 2. 
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Automatic Voltage Regulators  
Automatic Voltage Regulators (AVRs) are also known as Exciters or Excitation 
Systems, and are the control devices responsible for generating the voltage that is applied 
to the field circuit on the rotor. The field circuit appears in the equations as an input for 
the synchronous machine.  The AVR model is IEEE Type II which is shown in Chapter 2 
of this dissertation [1].  
Power System Stabilizer 
Power System Stabilizers (PSS) are control devices that are added to the 
synchronous machine in order to provide additional control for the speed or the voltage. 
The PSS model used for this dissertation is the model for speed control, and is applied to 
some but not all of the synchronous generators. The PSS model is Type II and is 
described by the state equations shown in Chapter 2. 
Wind Generator 
The wind turbine model simulated for this dissertation is comprised of a Weibull 
distribution speed model for the wind speed, a doubly-fed induction generator (DFIG) 
with a controller element representing speed, and pitch feedback to control the output 
power and voltage. The converter model is assumed to be lossless in order to simplify the 
calculations. The wind speed, turbine, and DFIG equations, including the voltage control 
equation containing the DFIG reference terminal voltage (Vref), are discussed below. The 
basic circuit diagram for the DFIG is shown in Figure 1.1, reproduced from Milano [1].  
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The wind speed model includes constant air density which can be manually 
corrected based on altitude, and is assumed to be at sea level. The Weibull Distribution 
function that is used to determine the wind speed is shown in Chapter 2. 
Is
Gear box
Converter
I c
Rotor
Induction Generator PCC
Vs
Vr
Vc  
Figure 1.1: Block diagram of DFIG 
The mechanical and electromechanical equations for the DFIG are based on the 
initial assumption that the converter controls decouple the generator from the grid. 
Generator complex power can be written from the rotor and stator currents. The rotor and 
stator currents and voltages are decomposed into direct- and quadrature-axes. [2] 
  The motion dynamic is based on a single shaft. The differential equations for the 
converter currents and pitch angle control are described in Chapter 2. 
 The existing literature and references that cover power system dynamic 
simulation are too numerous to list in detail. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
dynamic modeling techniques are based on works by P.M. Anderson, et al [2], [3],and the 
programming references for PSAT in the MATLAB environment can be found in the 
bibliography of [1]. 
1.2.2 Trajectory Sensitivity Analysis 
Beginning with sensitivity theory as described by Frank [4], dynamical systems 
with a state variable vector x, varying system parameters α, and system dynamics 
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function F(x) can be analyzed in terms of changes to the state variable with respect to 
changes in system parameters. These terms are called sensitivity functions S(α) and an 
approximate relationship between changes in system parameters and resulting changes in 
state variables is shown in equation (3) below. 
0 0
0
( , , , ),    ( )
( )
x f x t u x t x
x S
α
α α
= =
∆ ≈ ∆

          (3) 
Pai [5] applied sensitivity theory to power system transient stability assessment 
for power systems with the classical machine model where the only variables of concern 
were machine angles and generator shaft frequencies. TSA was used to create a dynamic 
security assessment tool to identify state parameters that have large effects on system 
stability and the state variables that will be affected. Laufenberg and Pai [6] then 
expanded the application to a differential-algebraic equation (DAE) representation of the 
power system. 
Given a dynamical system with the state variable vector x, network variable 
vector y, and system parameters that are subject to change α, the system dynamics can be 
expressed as shown in equations (4) and (5). 
   ( ) ( )0 0, , ,          x F x y t x t xα= =            (4) 
   ( ) ( )0 00 , , ,          G x y t y t yα= =            (5) 
The changes in the system parameters and variables with respect to system 
parameters can be expressed by augmenting the system equations (4) and (5) with the 
following equations (6) and (7). 
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1 1 2
F F Fw w w
x y α
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
               (6) 
1 20
G G Gw w
x y α
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
              (7) 
Where  1 2,   w x w yα α= ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂   
This set of equations can be solved using numerical techniques to analyze the 
effects of known disturbance or changes to the operating conditions, and have been used 
for dynamic security assessment purposes. While Laufenberg and Pai [5], [6] used the 
solved sensitivity functions as indicators of stability, Hou [7] used trajectory sensitivity 
techniques to estimate the trajectory of the state variables. Hou [7] then compared the 
estimated trajectory and actual trajectory during disturbances and found that the 
estimated state variable trajectory reasonably tracked the simulated state variable 
trajectories. These techniques will be utilized differently for the purposes of this 
dissertation and will be discussed further below. 
For power systems, the state variables can include bus voltage magnitudes, bus 
voltage angles, line current magnitudes and angles, bus frequency, generator frequency 
and shaft angle, generator field voltage and current controls, power system stabilizer 
variables, as well as other variables. The amount of state variables may increase or 
decrease depending on the level of complexity of the models and the number of buses 
being considered. In [5] and [6], small system examples are provided, while the authors 
of [7] performed TSA on a large model that ended up requiring parallel computing to 
solve the simultaneous DAE sets. 
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Because the potential size and complexity of the TSA problems, it is important to 
select the state variables of interest, state parameters, as well as system models carefully. 
Shubhanga and Kulkarni [8] use TSA to improve transient stability using shunt/series 
compensation and preventive generator rescheduling. In Tang and McCalley [9], TSA 
applications in various areas of power systems are discussed. In addition, [9] used TSA 
for estimation accuracy refinement. 
Distributed generation using synchronous generators with combustion turbines 
were studied by Chatterjee, et al [10] using the TSA technique to determine the critical 
values of different parameters and locate the distributed generation (DGs) in power 
systems. Mitra and Chatterjee [11] studied the impact of wind power (especially the 
DFIG) on the TSA for power system security assessment. Also, to the best of our 
knowledge none of the literature studied the self- and cross-interaction of DFIG 
variables. 
1.2.3 Basics of Out-of-Step Protection and Special Protection Schemes 
 Out-of-step protection is a type of protection that is based on the apparent 
impedance calculations at a protective device or measurement point located on a device 
that is deemed critical to power system operations such as a major transmission line 
where a loss of power transmission across the line will result in catastrophic system 
failure. Anderson [12] provides a basic overview to the philosophy as well as some 
examples. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) publishes 
requirements for designing, assessing, operating, and maintaining special protection 
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schemes [13 - 16], and these requirements are enforced by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Committee (FERC).  
 A protective relay can calculate the apparent impedance (Zapp) of the device it is 
protecting by using the measured voltage and current as shown in equation (8). 
( ) ( )app relay relay V IZ V I θ θ= ∠ −             (8) 
Where the θ symbol denotes the phasor angles and the bar above the variables indicate 
that the variables are phasors. 
 Out-of-step relay settings are established by performing a power system stability 
analysis via simulation. Scenarios where the protected device becomes unstable are 
determined, and the apparent impedances in these scenarios are used to create the settings 
of out-of-step relays. An example and application to the test systems in this dissertation 
will be shown in subsequent chapters. 
 The apparent impedance is continuously calculated by the relay for various 
functions, primarily the main protection settings, as well as for any local calculations. In 
some cases when the relay requires calculated impedance or measurements, 
communication methods such as phasor measurements are required. 
 Because of the status of out-of-step (OOS) protection schemes as a special 
protection scheme type, OOS are often deployed by utilities to solve localized problems 
or very specific scenarios that destabilize the power system. Examples of these schemes 
have been published from South Africa [17] to Texas [18] and several areas in between. 
The OOS analysis has become more important due to the increased presence of wind 
energy resources [18], because wind turbines have smaller amounts of stored energy in 
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the rotating mass, which in turn generates sub-synchronous swings in power systems that 
were not present in past synchronous machine-dominated systems. 
 In addition to the older definitions and settings of OOS protection, researchers 
and engineers have also worked on various methods of enhancing OOS protection. This 
includes implementing adaptive protection schemes so that the settings can adapt to the 
changing conditions of the power system around the relays [19], setting up relay blocking 
schemes that prevent inadvertent tripping when the power system conditions are 
swinging into the protection setting zone but will return to stability [20 – 22]. Lastly, the 
development of synchrophasor technology allowed for new and more accurate 
measurements as well as auxiliary functionalities to be applied as enhancement of OOS 
schemes [23 – 24]. 
1.2.4 Phasor Measurement Unit Basics 
 Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs, also called synchrophasors) are a class of 
measurement equipment that is defined by IEEE standard number C37.118.1TM-2011 [25] 
and C37.118.2TM-2011 [26]. The current version of the standard’s two volumes was 
modified from the 2005 version to provide additional specifications and to make the 
format of the standard consistent with IEC standards in anticipation of the IEEE standard 
being adopted for use by IEC.  
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Figure 1.2: IEEE C37.118.1-2011 standard phasor representation of a sinusoidal signal 
 PMUs utilize time synchronized sampling of an analog signal and the samples are 
processed to estimate phasor representations of the measured analog signal as shown in 
Figure 1.2. There are several manufacturers that utilize different methods of signal 
processing to produce the phasor estimates, but the IEEE standard specifies the format of 
the output, the quality of the measurements, and the message packet contents for 
communication purposes. This assures that the PMUs output uniform measurements 
across vendors. Figure 1.3 shows the standard message format for PMUs.  
 
Figure 1.3: IEEE C37.118.2-2011 standard message format 
The information included in each message frame is listed below. 
SYNC:  Frame synchronizing word. 
FRAMESIZE:  Total number of bytes in the frame. 
IDCODE:  PMU ID Number. 
SYNC FRAMESIZE IDCODE SOC FRACSEC 
STAT PHASORS FREQ 
2 bytes 
DFREQ ANALOG DIGITAL 
Frame 1 
CHK 
2 bytes 
Frame 2 
2 bytes 
Frame 3 
4 bytes 
Frame 4 
4 bytes 
Frame 5 
2 bytes 
Frame 6 
Variable Size 
Frame 7 
2 or 4 bytes 
Frame 8 
2 or 4  bytes 
Frame 9 
2 or 4 bytes 
Frame 10 
2 bytes 
Frame 11 
2 bytes 
Frame 12 
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SOC:   GPS time stamp. 
FRACSEC:  Fraction of Second and Time Quality. 
STAT:   Status flags. 
PHASORS:  Actual phasor measurement results. (See more details below) 
FREQ:   Frequency. 
DFREQ:  Rate of change of frequency. 
ANALOG:  Analog data that can be added to the message. 
DIGITAL:  Digital data that can be added to the message. 
CHK:   CRC error check. 
 The PHASORS, FREQ, DFREQ, ANALOG, and DIGITAL frames can be 
repeated for the number of PMU measurements to be included in the message, and the 
number of PMU measurements included in a message is specified in the SYNC frame. 
Messages coming from a phasor data concentrator can have dozens or hundreds of PMU 
measurements within one message. The phasors for each PMU can include voltages 
and/or currents, it can be expressed in polar or rectangular form, and can be positive 
sequence only or three-phase quantities. Analog and digital data frames can include other 
measurement data, equipment status bits or digital communication data as the user deems 
necessary. 
One of the practical considerations of the special protection scheme is the case 
where PMUs are not located at every bus, the trajectory sensitivity and special protection 
scheme equations will be modified accordingly. This is a consideration because it is not 
practical for PMUs to be located at every bus. Buses that do not have PMUs installed are 
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usually handled in terms of pseudo-measurements that are calculated from adjacent buses 
with PMUs. 
1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation 
Previous literature used trajectory sensitivity analysis to perform security 
assessments to determine if a disturbance will result in undesired state variable values. 
This research uses those techniques and extends the use of trajectory sensitivity analysis 
to determine how to reach a desired outcome or desired state variable values. 
Existing special protection schemes often have limited sets of goals and control 
actions, such as controlling capacitor switching to maintain voltage stability or 
controlling generation parameters to maintain angular stability. The proposed scheme 
aims to maintain both voltage and angular stability simultaneously, while using as many 
control actions as necessary. 
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Determine Unstable Scenarios 
Using the PSAT toolbox to simulate a large power system, the IEEE 68-Bus Test 
System, one of the main tie lines between two major sub-systems are analyzed for its role 
in maintaining stability and preventing the two sub-areas from separation. Cases with 
separation of the two sub-areas are considered catastrophically unstable scenarios 
because the smaller systems that remain have large mismatches between generation 
capacity and loads. 
Instability can also be detected by analyzing the mode of oscillation of bus angle 
and frequency measurements. Tools that utilize this technique are already commercially 
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available in some of the newer relays and phasor data concentrators. The measurement of 
the angle and frequency (δ, ω) are analyzed over a window of time and evaluated curve-
fitted time functions to determine if the variables appear underdamped, critically damped 
or undamped (unstable cases) or well-damped (stable). The mode of oscillation is a 
complex number that can be transmitted from the relays/PDCs by appending the values to 
the synchorphasor message. 
1.4.2 Selecting the Protective & Control Actions 
When the power system is characterized as sets of dynamic state equations and 
power flow equations, the voltages, angles, frequencies, and power flows are the state 
variables that are being monitored. Keeping these state variable values within acceptable 
ranges is the goal of the special protection scheme and it can be achieved by using 
protective and control actions on the power system. The protective and control actions 
include switching on reactive power assets (changes to Qc), connecting or disconnecting 
lines (changes to Ybus, Zbus), changes to excitation and PSS controls (changes to ωref, Vgen, 
Efield) and changes to generator output power (Pgen,ref, Pturbine.ref).  
In the power flow equations and system dynamic equations, these values are 
characterized as either state equation inputs or system parameters. Using the trajectory 
sensitivity analysis, we can determine which parameters have the highest sensitivity 
coefficients and determine which variables should be manipulated to restore stability and 
prevent any existing out-of-step protection from disconnecting a line, thereby causing the 
catastrophic failure. 
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 CHAPTER 2  
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF TSA 
 In this chapter, the mathematical formulations of the trajectory sensitivity analysis 
(TSA) will be presented in greater details. This will take the form of the application to 
power systems starting from a simple example and expanding to a larger generalized 
system. The TSA model will then be revised further to accommodate the fact that the 
system information is not a true set of measurements but rather discrete simulation 
outputs. This exercise is performed first for a simple classical machine system, then a 
larger 9-bus power system, and last with a 68-bus system. The 68-bus system will 
become the focus of the out-of-step protection design. Finally, the logic diagram of the 
special protection scheme is developed to include the results of the previous sections. 
2.1 TSA Equation Formulation 
2.1.1 Simple Dynamical System 
 As seen from equations (3) through (7) in Chapter 1, the TSA equations result in 
the sensitivity factors becoming additional state variables that must be solved after the 
original state variables are solved. In the cases of simple dynamical systems, the system 
can be modeled purely with dynamical equations and do not have any algebraic equations 
or other mathematical constraints. This corresponds to systems that can be described by a 
system similar to equation (3). The process for calculating the sensitivity coefficients is 
shown in Figure 2.1 in the next page. This means that for n state variables and m 
parameters of interest, there are n state equations and m×n sensitivity equations that need 
to be solved, or a total of n×(m+1) equations. 
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Figure 2.1: Process for calculating sensitivity factors of a dynamical system 
 From the process and equations shown in Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the 
sensitivity coefficients – members of the w vector – are calculated independently of 
solving for the state variables, but they will require the state variables to be solved in the 
cases where the partial differentials contain state variable terms. The trajectory sensitivity 
analysis above is based on the system dynamic containing continuous functions that are 
not being subjected to sudden changes in the structure of the system. This is discussed in 
greater detail by Frank [4]. When the system experiences sudden changes in system 
topology, and when the system exhibits hybrid differential-algebraic-discrete structure 
(such as a power system), the application of trajectory sensitivity analysis has to be 
adjusted to account for the system properties and the borders between discrete system 
changes. This treatment is introduced by Hiskens and Pai [27]. 
State Equations: 
  
Partial Differentials of x 
  
Partial Differentials of α 
  
Sensitivity Factor Equations 
 
  
 
Solve 
For 
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2.1.2 Systems with Dynamic and Algebraic Equations 
 Systems that exhibit dynamical properties while also being constrained by 
algebraic equations are exemplified in equations (4) and (5) in Chapter 1. The system will 
also contain state variables (x) and system outputs (y) that are dependent on each other, 
which means that taking partial differentials will result in cross-coupled terms. These 
terms when expanded using the first order Taylor series will result in the solution form in 
equations (6) and (7). Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 show two different approaches to solving 
these coefficients with two different types of time domain simulation. 
2.2 TSA Application for Power Systems 
2.2.1 Simple Dynamical System 
 In this section, a very simple electric machine model and swing equation will be 
used as an example of TSA analysis. The synchronous machine is modeled as a rotating 
mass with an inertia constant H, electrically modeled as an impedance connected in series 
to a constant EMF. Using one machine connected to an infinite bus model shown in 
Figure 2.2, the swing equation is shown below. The system and its related equations are 
examined in further details by Anderson and Fouad [2]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Simple system with synchronous machine connected to an infinite bus 
Bus 1 
(Machine EMF) 
E1∠δ1 
Bus 2 
(Infinite Bus) 
E2∠δ2 
Transmission Line, ZTL Machine X’d 
Pmech 
Total Admittance, Y12 
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1 1
1
1 1 2 12 12 1
2 cos( )
R
mech
R
dH D P E E Y
dt
d ω ω
ω
ω θ d
ω
= −
+ = − −

         (9) 
Where, in per-unit unless stated otherwise, the variables are: 
H  Machine’s Inertia Constant 
D  Machine’s Damping Constant 
ω1  Speed of Rotation, p.u. 
ωR  System’s Rated Speed of Rotation, radians/sec. (2πf, or 1 p.u.) 
E1∠δ1  Machine’s EMF in p.u. and angle in radians (bus 1) 
E2∠δ2  Infinite Bus Voltage with angle of zero (bus 2, δ2=0) 
Pmech  Mechanical Power Input to the Generator 
Y12∠θ12 Admittance Between Buses 1 and 2 
 The system shown in Figure 2.2 and equation (9) can be further simplified by 
assuming the transmission line is purely reactive (θ12=90°). The state variables for this 
system will include the machine’s rotor angle δ1(t) and the speed of rotation ω1(t). This 
results in the following nonlinear state equations. Pe,max is the maximum power transfer 
across the line, or E1E2Y12. 
1 1
2 2
1 2
,max
2 2 1
1
sin( )
2 2 2
R eR mech R
x
x
x x
PP Dx x x
H H H
d
ω
ωω ω
   
=   
   
= −
= − −


       (10) 
 The partial derivatives with respect to the state variables (Jacobian) can be easily 
determined. 
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,max
1
0 1
cos( )
2 2
R e R
f
P Dx x
H H
ω ω
 
∂  =  ∂ − −
  
         (11) 
The parameters that will be studied for trajectory sensitivity include the 
mechanical power, machine damping constant, and the maximum power transfer. The 
partial derivatives with respect to the system parameters can then be determined. 
,max
2 1
0 0 0
sin( )
2 2 2
T
mech e
R R R
P D P
f
x x
H H H
α
ω ω ωα
 =  
 
∂  =
 ∂ − −
 
        (12) 
The parts are now in place to calculate the sensitivity factors using the process 
shown in Figure 2.1 (page 16). 
[ ] 1 ,max1 11 2 3
2 2 2 ,max
emech
mech e
x Px P x D
w w w
x P x D x P
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=  
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
      (13) 
1 1
0
2
R
fw w
x
H
ω
 
∂  = +
 ∂
 
            (14) 
2 2
2
0
2
R
fw w
x x
H
ω
 
∂  = +
 ∂ −
 
           (15) 
3 3
1
0
sin( )
2
R
fw w
x x
H
ω
 
∂  = +
 ∂ −
 
               (16) 
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 With the system equations setup above, a numerical example with the following 
parameters is evaluated using MATLAB. The machine has an inertia constant of 1.25 
p.u., a damping constant of 0.25 p.u., an EMF of 1.05, the initial combined line and 
machine reactance is 0.125 p.u., the infinite bus voltage is 1.00 p.u., the system rated 
frequency is 60 Hz., and the initial electrical and mechanical power in p.u. is 2.0. This 
results in the initial Pe,max value of 8.4 p.u., ω(0) is 1 p.u., and δ(0) is 0.24 radian. The 
system is simulated as a faulted system where Pe,max suddenly drops to 5. This results in 
the following set of equations. The initial values of w1, w2, w3 can be calculated by 
evaluating equations (14) through (16) at the initial conditions of x and setting the left 
hand side of these equations to zero. 
1 2 1
2 2 1 2
1
1 1 1
1
2
1,                                 (0) 0.24
0.8 0.2 2sin( ),       (0) 1
0 1
2cos( ) 0.2
0 1 0 0
,                    w (0)
2cos( ) 0.2 0.4 0.2059
0 1
2co
x x x
x x x x
f
xx
w w
x
w
= − =
= − − =
 ∂
=  − −∂  
     
= + =     − −     
=
−



 2 2
1 2
3 3 3
1 1
0 0
,            w (0)
s( ) 0.2 0.4 0.2059
0 1 0 0
,     w (0)
2cos( ) 0.2 0.4sin( ) 0.049
w
x x
w w
x x
     
+ =     − − −    
     
= + =     − − − −    

 
 The results of this simulation are shown in the figures below. Figure 2.3 shows 
the phase plot of the angle (x1) versus frequency (x2) and the plot of the state variables 
with respect to time. Note that the initial conditions and the post-fault system combine to 
result in the state variables being well within the stable operating region. Figure 2.4 
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shows the plots of the calculated sensitivity coefficients, sorted by the state variables 
associated with each coefficient. 
 There are a few observations that can be quickly made based on this simple 
example. However, the electric machine model used here is the most simplistic and the 
power flow and voltage equations have not been addressed yet. In the following section, a 
system with more detailed models is analyzed. 
 
Figure 2.3: Phase-plane plot of machine angle vs. frequency (left) and time plot of 
machine angle (solid line) and frequency (right). 
 
Figure 2.4: Plots of ∂δ⁄∂Pmech,  ∂δ⁄∂D,  ∂δ⁄∂Pe,max against time, labeled w1_1, w2_1, and 
w3_1 respectively (left) and plots of ∂ω⁄∂Pmech,  ∂ω⁄∂D,  ∂ω⁄∂Pe,max against time, labeled 
w1_2, w2_2, and w3_2 respectively. 
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2.2.2 TSA Application for Small Power System Model with DAE System Equations 
 Power systems in practice are modeled as a hybrid system as defined by Hiskens 
and Pai [27], where parts of the state equations are differential equations and parts are 
algebraic equations. In this section, an example using the nine bus system from Anderson 
and Fouad [2] is used to derive TSA equations when the system is modeled in greater 
detail.   
 First, the power system equations now include an algebraic component as well as 
differential equations, as expressed in equations (4) through (7) in the first chapter.  
 In this section, the synchronous machine is represented as the one-axis model 
with armature and field resistances neglected as well as field voltage equation. For a 
simple example of one machine connected to an infinite bus, with the infinite bus 
represented as 𝑉𝑉∞ and an angle of zero, the system equations are shown below. 
Rd ω ω= −              (17) 
( ) ( )( )' '2 R mech q q q d d q RP E I x x I I DH
ω
ω ω ω = − + − + −  
        (18) 
( )( )' ' ''
0
1
q q d d d fd
d
E E x x I E
τ
= − + − +          (19) 
( )( )1fd fd ref t A
A
E E V V K
τ
= − + −           (20) 
0 sin( )q q tx I V d θ= − −            (21) 
' '0 cos( )q t d dE V x Id θ= − − −           (22) 
0 sin( ) sine d e q tR I X I V Vd θ d∞= − + + − −          (23) 
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0 cos( ) cose d e q tX I R I V Vd θ d∞= − − + − −          (24) 
 Equations (17) through (20) are the dynamic equations with the machine rotor 
angle δ, speed of rotation ω, q-axis armature voltage E’q, and field voltage Efd as the state 
variables. Because the q-axis and field voltages are parameters that are not usually 
measured directly, equations (21) and (22) are the decomposition of the q-axis and d-axis 
currents with respect to the terminal voltage Vt. Equations (23) and (24) are the Ohm’s 
Law equations that govern the behavior of the terminal voltage decomposed along the d-
axis and the q-axis. In larger systems this will be replaced by power flow equations or 
injected current equations. 
 During the simulation, the state variables (x) include δ, ω, E’q, and Efd, while the 
auxiliary variables (y) include Id and Iq, and the variables that are analyzed for sensitivity 
include the system transmission impedances, shunt admittances, load admittance and 
generator input mechanical power. The system used for this analysis is shown in Figure 
2.5 on the next page. The machine and other data are provided in chapter 2 of Anderson 
& Fouad [2]. The system equations then become the set of equations listed on the next 
page. 
24 
 
 
 Figure 2.5: Nine bus system from Anderson & Fouad [2]  
 System parameters shown below are based on the values listed in [2] but with the 
base power converted to 100 MVA. 
1 1 11 ( , , , )d ω α= − = f x y t  2 2 21 ( , , , )d ω α= − = f x y t  3 3 31 ( , , , )d ω α= − = f x y t  
( ) ( )( )'1 1 1 1 1 1 41 0.716 0.03915 0.02457 0.80808 1 ( , , , )47.28ω ω α= − + − + − =   q q d qE I I I f x y t  
( ) ( )( )'2 2 2 2 2 2 51 1.63 0.45026 0.0624 1.04167 1 ( , , , )12.8ω ω α= − + − + − =   q q d qE I I I f x y t
( ) ( )( )'3 3 3 3 3 3 61 0.85 0.98266 0.14164 1.5625 1 ( , , , )6.02ω ω α= − + − + − =   q q d qE I I I f x y t  
( )( )' '1 1 1 1 71 0.05899 0.02457 = ( , , , )8.96 α= − + − +q q d fdE E I E f x y t  
( )( )' '1 2 2 2 81 0.46656 0.0624 = ( , , , )6 α= − + − +q q d fdE E I E f x y t  
( )( )' '3 3 3 3 91 1.02539 0.14164 = ( , , , )5.89 α= − + − +q q d fdE E I E f x y t  
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( )( )1 1 1 101 1.040 100 = ( , , , )0.02 α= − + −
 fd fd tE E V f x y t  
( )( )2 2 2 111 1.025 25 = ( , , , )0.2 α= − + −
 fd fd tE E V f x y t  
( )( )3 3 3 121 1.025 25 = ( , , , )0.2 α= − + −
 fd fd tE E V f x y t  
The set of equations above are the state variable equations for the system 
dynamics. Each equation is given an fi(x,y,α,t) designation corresponding to its position in 
F(x,y,α,t). For this analysis, the generator stator resistances are assumed zero 
(ra<<X’d,X’q) and the generator terminal voltages and currents are solved using the 
techniques for analyzing the terminal conditions introduced in chapters 4 and 5 of 
Anderson & Fouad [2]. The equations below are given gi(x,y,α) designations 
corresponding to their positions in G(x,y,α). 
1 1 1 1 1 10 sin( )= ( , , )d θ α= − −q q tx I V g x y  
2 2 2 2 2 20 sin( )= ( , , )d θ α= − −q q tx I V g x y  
3 3 3 3 3 30 sin( )= ( , , )d θ α= − −q q tx I V g x y  
' '
1 1 1 1 1 1 40 cos( ) = ( , , )d θ α= − − −q t d dE V x I g x y  
' '
2 2 2 2 2 2 50 cos( ) = ( , , )d θ α= − − −q t d dE V x I g x y  
' '
3 3 3 3 3 3 60 cos( ) = ( , , )d θ α= − − −q t d dE V x I g x y  
 The following equations are the voltage drop and KCL equations that will relate 
the power flow restrictions to the system state variables. The Ia variables represent the 
generator terminal currents solved by the power flow. For this particular system, the 
26 
 
generator currents travel through the transformers where the transformer shunt elements 
and resistances are ignored before entering the high voltage buses that are connected to 
the load buses. Therefore, one way to create the zero-sum functions is to derive the KCL 
equations around the high voltage buses nearest to the generators. Then the equations are 
decomposed along the d-axis and q-axis of each machine. The angle term γij represent the 
angles of the admittance between buses i and j. 
Phasor KCLs: 
( ) ( )1 5 4 45 6 4 46 4 44aI V V Y V V Y V Y= − + − +  
( ) ( )2 8 7 78 5 7 57 7 77aI V V Y V V Y V Y= − + − +  
( ) ( )3 8 9 89 6 9 69 9 99aI V V Y V V Y V Y= − + − +  
Decomposed KCLs form the remainder of the G(x,y,α) functions: 
1 4 45 4 45 1 4 46 4 46 1 4 44 4 44 1
5 45 5 45 1 6 46 6 46 1
0 cos( ) cos( ) cos( ) ...7
cos( ) cos( )
( , , ) qg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
 
1 4 45 4 45 1 4 46 4 46 1 4 44 4 44 1
5 45 5 45 1 6 46 6 46 1
0 sin( ) sin( ) sin( ) ...8
sin( ) sin( )
( , , ) dg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
 
2 7 57 7 57 2 7 78 7 78 2 7 77 7 77 2
5 57 5 57 2 8 78 8 78 2
0 cos( ) cos( ) cos( ) ...9
cos( ) cos( )
( , , ) qg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
 
2 7 57 7 57 2 7 78 7 78 2 7 77 7 77 2
5 57 5 57 2 8 78 8 78 2
0 sin( ) sin( ) sin( ) ...10
sin( ) sin( )
( , , ) dg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
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3 9 69 9 69 3 9 89 9 89 3 9 99 9 99 3
6 69 6 69 3 8 89 8 89 3
0 cos( ) cos( ) cos( ) ...11
cos( ) cos( )
( , , ) qg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
 
3 9 69 9 69 3 9 89 9 89 3 9 99 9 99 3
6 69 6 69 3 8 89 8 89 3
0 sin( ) sin( ) sin( ) ...12
sin( ) sin( )
( , , ) dg I V Y V Y V Y
V Y V Y
x y θ g d θ g d θ g d
θ g d θ g d
α = − − + − − + − + + − +
+ − + + −
=
 
The initial conditions for Efd, δ, and E’q can be calculated using the equations 
below, with ϕi representing the power angle between the terminal voltage and armature 
current of generator at bus i. 
'
,0 ,01
,0 '
,0 ,0
sin sin( 90 )
tan
cos cos( 90 )
i i ai qi i
i
i i ai qi i
V I x
V I x
θ φ
d
θ φ
−
 + +
 =
 + + 


             (25) 
' ' ' ' '
,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0cos( ) cos( 90 ) ( )qi ai i i q ai i i d q diE V x I x x Id θ φ d= − + + − − −          (26) 
,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0cos( ) cos( 90 ) ( )fd i ai i i q ai i i d q diE V x I x x Id θ φ d≅ − + + − − −        (27) 
1 1 1sind aI I d= −  2 2 2sind aI I d= −  3 3 3sind aI I d= −           
1 1 1cosq aI I d=  2 2 2cosq aI I d=  3 3 3cosq aI I d=         (28) 
 In order to begin the sensitivity coefficient analysis, the system state variables (x), 
auxiliary variables (y), and parameters of interest (α) are defined below. 
' ' '
1 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 32 q q q FD FD FDx E E E E E Ed d d ω ω ω
 =     (29) 
1 2 3 1 2 3d d d q q qy I I I I I I =             (30) 
[ ]1 2 3 44 77 99mech mech mechP P P Y Y Yα =          (31) 
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 The mechanical power and shunt admittances at the substation buses are chosen 
as the parameters under analysis in order to see if manipulation of switched shunts is 
more or less effective than manipulating the turbine controls. We then form the 
sensitivity coefficient equations using equations (4) and (5), with the F functions being 
the dynamic functions, and the G functions being the KCL and terminal current 
equations. The sensitivity coefficients for each of the α parameters can be further derived 
below, with the index w1j refers to the sensitivity of state variable with respect to the 
parameter αj as follows. 
13 15 161 11 12 14
23 25 262 21 22 24
, , , , ,
w w ww w w w
w
w w ww w w w
             
= =              
             
      (32) 
 For example, j=1 so α1=Pmech1, and the sensitivity coefficients with respect to 
Pmech1 are calculated with equations (33) and (34) below. 
11 11 21
1
F F Fw w w
x y α
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
          (33) 
11 21
1
0 G G Gw w
x y α
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
          (34) 
 Each element of equations (33) and (34) are from the Jacobian matrices of the 
state equations, and the solutions for all the members of w in equation (32) can be done in 
each time step. The Jacobian matrices are updated at each time step, and the matrices are 
sparse. The ∂F/∂x matrix has 18 nonzero terms, the ∂F/∂y matrix has 9 nonzero terms, the 
∂G/∂x matrix has 15 nonzero terms, and finally ∂G/∂y has 12 nonzero terms. Of those 
terms, a total 33 terms are constants. A brief linear algebra analysis of the Jacobian 
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matrices indicate that the equations for the sensitivity coefficients are not 
underdetermined. 
 The format of equations (33) and (34) can be adjusted in order to calculate the 
sensitivity coefficients on a time-step basis. This is done by using the coefficients of the 
previous time step (𝑤𝑤1,𝑡𝑡−,𝑤𝑤2,𝑡𝑡−) to calculate for the ?̇?𝑤1 rates of change using equation 
(33). Then the coefficients at the end of the time step  (𝑤𝑤1,𝑡𝑡+) can be estimated by basic 
trapezoidal integration and finally the (𝑤𝑤2,𝑡𝑡+) coefficients are calculated using equation 
(34). 
 The calculation steps and results below are based on time simulation of the 
aforementioned 9-bus system using PSS/E software. The flowcharts in Figures 2.6 and 
2.7 show the calculations required to process the PSS/E outputs into formats that can be 
used to calculate the coefficients as well as the steps to calculate the coefficients.   
 
Figure 2.6: Flowchart of data used for calculating the sensitivity coefficients 
PSS/E Outputs: 
Bus Vi, θi; Line Pij, Qij; Generator δi, ∆ωi, 
 
𝐼𝐼?̅?𝐺𝐺𝐺 = ((𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝑗𝑗𝑄𝑄𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) 𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺∠𝜃𝜃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺⁄ )∗ = |𝐼𝐼?̅?𝐺𝐺𝐺|∠∅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 Calculate Generator Line Currents 
Generator d-axis and q-axis Currents 
𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑,𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 = −|𝐼𝐼?̅?𝐺𝐺𝐺|sin(∅𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 + 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) 
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See Figure 11 for details 
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Figure 2.7: Steps for calculating the coefficients with equations 33 and 34. The index k 
represents the α parameters, k=1..6. 
 
2.2.3 TSA Application for Larger Power Systems with DAE Equations 
 In order to analyze how TSA and the special protection scheme in this dissertation 
will perform, modeling with larger systems must be done in order to achieve a reasonable 
simulation of a real system. For most of the discussions and results in the remainder of 
this dissertation, the IEEE 68-Bus test system will be used. The system model is a 16-
machine five-area study system, shown in Figure 2.8, is considered for this study. The 
limited number of buses allows for reasonable debugging and troubleshooting during the 
development of the methodology. The algorithm being tested is written with generic and 
expandable formatting such that expansion to system models with a larger amount of 
buses can be achieved. This system contains five sub-areas [28], with two areas 
represented by a group of generators whereas each of the three remaining regions is 
?̇?𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡+ = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡− + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡− + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘�𝑡𝑡− 
Calculate ?̇?𝑤1𝑘𝑘for the time t, using 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−,𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡− from 
previous time step 
𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡+ = 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡− + 12∆𝑡𝑡 × ?̇?𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡+ Calculate 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+ with simple trapezoidal integration 
?̇?𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡0 = 0 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘�0 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘�0 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘�0 
If initial time of run: 
Simultaneously solve w1k, w2k with linear equations. 
0 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥
𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘�
𝑡𝑡+
+ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘�
𝑡𝑡+
+ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
�
𝑡𝑡+
 
Calculate 𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+ by substituting 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘|𝑡𝑡+ into equation 33 
Use 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+ in special protection scheme 
Use 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+,𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡+ as 𝑤𝑤1𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡−,𝑤𝑤2𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡− for 
the next time step 
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represented by an equivalent generator. The system data is obtained from Kundur [28]. 
Area #1 is the only area with AVRs, as the generators in other areas are reduced only to 
the synchronous machine models for simplicity. Only one PSS is modeled as a wash out 
block and two lead-lag blocks (Type II) and installed at G9 to ensure the base system 
stability (for the simulation purpose). 
 The IEEE 68-Bus test system will later be modified by adding wind generation 
modeled as wind turbines with doubly-fed induction generators (DFIG). The system is 
modified by replacing the synchronous machines with the wind generators at bus 1 and 
bus 12. The DFIG parameters are taken from the model properties in one of the time 
domain simulation test cases [10]. The system topology with the modification is shown in 
Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: Modified IEEE 68-Bus test system with two wind generators at bus 1 and bus 
12 (highlighted). 
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The model state equations for each of the power system components are listed in 
the equations and variables below. It would become obvious that the level of complexity 
and volume of equations that have to be solved are much greater than the small system in 
the previous section. 
Synchronous Machines 
 With the synchronous machine models described in Chapter 1, the equations for 
the synchronous machines are shown in equations (35) through (43). The motion 
equations (35), (36) govern the transfer from mechanical power transmitted through the 
shaft to the electrical power and accounts for the inertia of the rotating mass. Equations 
(37) to (40) model the mutual electromagnetic interactions between the rotor and stator 
circuits transferred that govern the electromotive forces and stator currents. Equations 
(41) to (43) describe the circuit conditions and power output of the generator, known 
collectively as the generator terminal conditions.   
( )1bd ω ω= −                   (35) 
( )( )1 /m ep p D Mω ω= − − −              (36) 
( ) ( )
" "
' ' ' ' '0
0' ' '
0 0
1 /d d AAq s q d d d d d f d
d d d
T x Te f e x x x x i v T
T x T
    
 = − − − − − + −           
         (37) 
( )
" "
0' ' ' ' '
0' '
0
/q qd d q q q q q q
q q
T x
e e x x x x i T
T x
  
  = − + − − −
  
  
            (38) 
( )
" "
" " ' ' ' "0
0' ' '
0 0
1 /d d AAq q q d d d d d f d
d d d
T x Te e e x x x x i v T
T x T
    
 = − + − − − − + −           
         (39) 
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( )
" "
0' " ' ' ' "
0' '
0
/q qd d d q q q q q q
q q
T x
e e e x x x x i T
T x
  
  = − + + − − −
  
  
              (40) 
( ) ( )e q a q q d a d dp v r i i v r i i= + + +                 (41) 
( )" "0 q a q q d l dv r i e x x i= + − + −                            (42) 
( )" "0 d a d d q l qv r i e x x i= + − + −                            (43) 
The following list defines variables and parameters that are not previously noted. 
ωb  Base rate of rotation, radians per second  
M  Moment of Inertia  
D  Droop characteristic constant  
v*f  Field voltage, per unit  
Td0, T’d0,T”d0 Direct-axis electromagnetic time constants  
Tq0, T’q0,T”q0 Quadrature-axis electromagnetic time constants  
TAA  Field circuit time constant 
xd, x’d, x”d Steady-state, transient, sub-transient  direct-axis circuit reactances  
xq, x’q, x”q Steady-state, transient, sub-transient  quadrature-axis circuit reactances  
xl  Leakage reactance  
fs(e’q)   Magnetic saturation function  
Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR, or Exciters) 
The AVR control model is based on the IEEE type II standard, and the model 
block diagram is shown in Figure 2.9, reproduced from Milano [1]. The model output 
(field circuit voltage, vf) is then linked to the field-induced elements in the synchronous 
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machine model modeled in equations (37) and (39). The field circuit generates the 
electromagnetic field that emits from the rotor of the synchronous machine. 
 
Figure 2.9: IEEE Type II Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR, or Exciter) model block 
diagram. Reproduced from Milano [1]. 
( ) /v V v Tm m r= −                         (44) 
( ) /1 2 1
K fv K v v v v v Tr a ref m r f r rT f
 
 = − − − −
 
 
                       (45)
 if 1 ,min 1 ,max
 if ,max 1 ,max
 if ,min 1 ,min
v v v vr r r r
v v v vr r r r
v v vr r r
 ≤ ≤
= >

<
                    (46) 
/2 2
K fv v v Tr f r fT f
 
 = − +
 
 
                         (47)     
( )( )1 ( ) /v v S v v Tf f e f r e= − + −               (48)   
Where 
V  Machine terminal voltage 
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vm  Machine measured voltage (after measurement block) 
Tr  Measurement time constant 
Ka  Amplifier gain 
vref  Reference voltage 
vr1, vr2  Regulator signals 
Kf  Stabilizer gain 
Tf  Stabilizer time constant 
Se(vf)  Saturation function  
Power System Stabilizers (PSS) 
The PSS control model is based on the IEEE type II standard, and the model 
block diagram is shown in Figure 2.10, also reproduced from Milano [1]. The model 
output (stabilizing signal, vs) is then summed into the reference voltage of the AVR in 
equation (45). The dynamic equations of the PSS are shown in equations (49) through 
(52). 
 
Figure 2.10: IEEE Type II Power System Stabilizer (PSS) model block diagram. 
Reproduced from Milano [1]. 
( ) /1 1v K v v TSIω ω= − +                 (49) 
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( )11 /2 1 2 2
2
T
v K v v v TSIT ω
  
= − + −      
              (50) 
( )3 11 /3 2 1 3 4
4 2
T T
v v K v v v TSIT T ω
     
 = − + + −              
            (51) 
( )3 1 /3 2 1
4 2
T T
v v v K v v v Ts SI sT T ω ε
  
= + + + −      
                   (52) 
Where 
v1, v2, v3  First, second, and third stabilizer outputs 
vs   Stabilizer output signal 
vSI   Stabilizer input signal 
Kω   Stabilizer gain 
T1, T2, T3, T4  First through fourth Stabilizer time constants 
Tω   Wash-out time constant 
Tε   Stabilizer output time constants 
Wind Turbine and DFIG Models 
The wind turbine model used in this dissertation is comprised of a Weibull 
distribution speed model for the wind speed, a DFIG with a controller element 
representing speed, and pitch feedback to control the output power and voltage. The 
converter model is assumed to be lossless in order to simplify the calculations. The 
Weibull Distribution function that is used to determine the wind speed is shown in 
equations (53) and (54). 
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( )( , , )
kv ck k wf v c k v ew wkc
−
=                            (53) 
1/ln ( )( )
ktv tw c
 = − 
 
                                   (54) 
Where   
ℓ(t)   Random number generator function. 
vw  Wind speed 
c  Scale factor in Weibull Distribution  
k   Shape factor in Weibull Distribution  
vwa  Average wind speed 
The mechanical and electromechanical equations for the DFIG are based on the 
initial assumption that the converter controls decouple the generator from the grid. 
Generator complex power can be written from the rotor and stator currents in equations 
(55) and (56). The rotor and stator currents and voltages are decomposed into direct- and 
quadrature-axes. The motion dynamic (57) is based on a single shaft. The differential 
equations for the converter currents and pitch angle control are described in (58) through 
(60) below. 
P v i v i v i v ids ds qs qs dr dr qr qr= + + +                           (55) 
Q v i v i v i v iqs ds ds qs qr dr dr qr= − + −                            (56) 
( ) / 2T T Hm e mω = −                        (57) 
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( P ( ) / ) /
x xs mi i Tqr w m m qrx Vm
ω ω ε
+
= − −                             (58) 
( ) /i K V V x idr V ref m dr= − −                                          (59) 
( )( ) /K Tp p m ref p pθ φ ω ω θ= − −                                            (60) 
Where 
ωm  Shaft speed 
Te  Electrical torque 
Tm  Mechanical torque 
Pw   Mechanical power extracted from wind 
θp  Pitch angle, radians 
idr, ids   Direct axis rotor (r) and stator (s) currents  
iqr, iqs  Quadrature axis rotor (r) and stator (s) currents 
vdr, vds   Direct axis rotor (r) and stator (s) voltages 
vqr, vqs  Quadrature axis rotor (r) and stator (s) voltages 
Vref  Reference voltage 
xm  Magnetizing reactance 
Hm  Rotor inertia 
Kp  Pitch control gain 
Tp  Pitch control time constant 
KV  Voltage control gain 
Tε  Power control time constant 
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Φ  Pitch control step function  
 Based on all of the models and equations listed above, the resulting system 
equations of the IEEE 68-bus system will result in 129 dynamic equations and 207 
algebraic equations. This volume of interconnected equations and variables is too large to 
directly derive and solve for the TSA coefficients. For larger systems in this dissertation, 
the TSA coefficients will be calculated using the method described below. 
 Due to programming flexibility and availability of resources, the TSA coefficients 
in the system described in this section are calculated using a modified version of the 
Power System Analysis Toolbox (PSAT) [1] in MATLAB. PSAT is chosen because of its 
availability as an open-source tool with detailed documentation, which lends itself well to 
modifications to add TSA calculation modules to the existing time-domain simulation 
structure. The data used in the simulations for this dissertation is slightly modified from 
the system studied by Abdelsalam [29]. 
The TSA algorithm begins with the execution of a conventional time domain 
algorithm [10] where the TSA specific variables are initiated. The time domain algorithm 
solves for the state variables (x) and outputs (y) for the power system models.  The TSA 
coefficient calculation algorithm is written to utilize the results and variables of the PSAT 
simulation within the MATLAB environment [1]. The time domain algorithm also 
generates partial differential matrices that are used for the TSA calculation. These 
matrices include ∂F/∂x, ∂F/∂y, ∂G/∂x and ∂G/∂y which are slightly modified to become 
the partial differential matrices in (6) and (7). The remaining ∂F/∂α and ∂G/∂α are 
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extracted from system simulation variables by defining α as a variable that is already in 
the time domain model environment and evaluated. 
The algorithm and the passing of variables and matrices between the time domain 
and TSA calculation environments are shown in Figure 2.11. In Figure 2.11, ∆t denotes 
the time increment and t denotes the time at which the simulation is running. The TSA 
coefficients w1 and w2 are obtained by solving the DAE in (6) and (7).  
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Figure 2.11: Flow chart of Time Domain Simulation and TSA Coefficients calculations 
and their interfaces. 
2.3 Determining Out-Of-Step (OOS) Relay Settings 
The OOS settings are dependent on the calculated apparent impedance seen by the 
relay, which is based on the measured voltage and current at the relay, and it is usually 
taken from the relays that are placed at the terminals of transmission lines. OOS 
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protection schemes primarily monitor the movements of the apparent impedance in 
relation to the fault protection settings.  
As described by Blackburn and Domin [30] the apparent impedance calculated by 
the relay will abruptly encroach the protection setting zones during a fault or major 
disturbance, while the same impedance will travel along a trajectory in a progressive 
fashion in the case of a power swing across the monitored line. This can be illustrated by 
using a simple two-area system with a transmission line between them, as shown in 
Figure 2.12.  
 
 Figure 2.12: Simple 2-area system used for illustrating out-of-step conditions. 
 In this example system, the two areas are reduced to an equivalent voltage source 
(S for sending end, R for receiving end) have the source voltages of ES and ER, 
respectively, as well as system equivalent impedances ZS and ZR. The transmission line 
that transfers power between the two is connected to buses A and B, and the line 
impedance ZL allows the current IL to flow from system S to R. All of these quantities are 
complex numbers or phasors representing the magnitudes and angles. For this case, the 
relay is considered to be installed at bus A. This means that the relay will simply 
calculate the apparent impedance as seen in equation (61). 
/A LZ V Iapp =                                            (61) 
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 Let’s also assume that the angle difference between the source voltages ES and ER 
phasors is δSR. The resulting equation for the apparent impedance becomes equation (62). 
( )S S L R
S
S R
E Z Z Z
Z Zapp E E
+ +
= −
−
                        (62) 
 The trajectory for the apparent impedance seen by the relay as the angle between 
the source voltages is varied, when plotted on an X-R plane, can be seen in Figure 2.13. 
 
Figure 2.13: Apparent impedance seen by the relays at bus A of the system shown in 
Figure 2.12. 
 Note that the trajectory of the impedance is determined almost completely by the 
angle between the two systems as long as the voltages remain stable. The purpose of 
OOS protection is to disconnect the system before the apparent impedance reaches a zone 
that represents undesirable operating conditions. This can be achieved in several different 
ways that depends on the operator’s protection philosophy as well as specific system 
conditions that are expected during disturbances. Anderson [12] and Kundur [28] as well 
as Blackburn and Domin [30] all have shown different examples of OOS philosophies 
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including using OOS to disconnect an unstable transmission line in order to prevent 
overloading or equipment damage during the high-magnitude portions of the swings, as 
well as using OOS to block certain system operations in order to prevent further 
perturbations in the system.  
 The characteristics of the OOS relay tripping zones are also varied, and can look 
like overlapping circles as seen in Figure 2.13 or concentric circles [30], or other types of 
zones established to correspond with the expected impedance trajectory during unstable 
conditions. Additional considerations may include preventing tripping when the angle 
across the line is at the maximum, such as when δSR approaches 180 degrees in Figure 16. 
Disconnections during this type of conditions will result in severe transient conditions 
around the switching equipment, especially transient recovery voltages, which could 
result in devices being exposed to very high voltages and suffering further damages. The 
principles and detailed discussions of transient recovery voltages are shown in Greenberg 
[31]. 
 Another consideration when setting OOS relays is load encroachment. This can be 
reviewed by plotting the apparent impedance seen by the relay as it corresponds to 
various loading conditions in both magnitude and power factor. The more power is 
transmitted through a line, the lower the apparent impedance becomes, and it is the 
responsibility of the protection engineer to avoid having OOS relays trip during heavy 
loading events that are stable. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the transmission lines being considered to 
apply OOS relays and the special protection scheme will have to be evaluated and the 
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impedance trajectories during disturbances will be reviewed in order to determine the 
OOS relay settings. For simplicity, the OOS relay settings for the transmission lines in 
the IEEE 68-bus system will be set as single boundary based on the simulated unstable 
encroachment. The single boundary scheme will have the basic apparent impedance 
shape as shown in Figure 2.14, where the boundary may be two parallel lines or a 
geometric shape surrounding the protection zone. 
 
Figure 2.14: Single blinder OOS relay characteristic. 
2.4 Planning The Special Protection Scheme. 
As required by NERC regulations [13 – 16], any new special protection scheme 
cannot interfere or degrade other protection systems unintentionally. This means that all 
of the other essential protection schemes such as fault protection or OOS cases where the 
special protection scheme will worsen the system must not result in the OOS operation. 
The general outline of the special protection scheme uses the philosophy outlined in 
Figure 2.15. 
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Figure 2.15: Special protection scheme operating philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SIMULATION AND CALCULATION RESULTS 
For this chapter, the results of simulations outlined in Chapter 2 are shown and 
discussed. First, the TSA coefficient results from the smaller 9-bus test system are shown 
and briefly discussed in order to establish the viability of calculating TSA coefficients in 
power systems. The following section shows the TSA coefficient results for the IEEE 68-
bus system. Afterwards, the apparent impedances calculated for the buses connected to 
the main transmission tie lines in the IEEE 68-bus sytem are examined. Finally, the 
conventional out-of-step relay setting is established and the settings for the special 
protection schemes are developed using the simulation results. 
3.1 TSA Coefficient Results for the 9-Bus Test System 
Simulation generator angles (δi), bus voltages at generator terminals (Vi), and 
frequency (∆ωi) are shown in Figures 3.1 through 3.3, and some of the trajectory 
coefficients are shown in Figure 3.4. Discussion of the results is presented in the 
following section. Note that the disturbance is presented as a 20% increase in load MVA 
at bus 8. 
 
Figure 3.1: Machine angles with respect to time during simulation.  
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Figure 3.2: Bus frequency deviation with respect to time during simulation.  
 
Figure 3.3: Bus voltages with respect to time during simulation.  
 
3.4a – coefficients wrt. Pmech1 
 
3.4b – coefficients wrt. Y44 
Figure 3.4: Sensitivity coefficients with respect to bus 1 mechanical power (3.4a) and bus 
4 shunt admittance (3.4b) for the simulation shown in Figures 3.1 through 3.3. 
 The sensitivities with respect to shunt admittances in Figures 3.4b and 3.5a and 
3.5b are shown in order to illustrate the effects that changes in other system parameters 
beyond the dynamic models can also influence the system state variables. 
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3.5c – coefficients wrt. Y77 
 
3.5d – coefficients wrt. Y99 
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity coefficients with respect to bus 7 shunt admittance (3.5a) 
and bus 9 shunt admittance for the simulation shown in Figure 3.1 (3.5b). 
 The system state variables by themselves, such as machine rotor angles, shaft 
speeds, voltages, etc., all provide insight into local stability for the aspects of the system 
surrounding that particular state variable. Unlike most systems, the power system has the 
ability to survive local instability by disconnecting the unstable parts to maintain 
operation in the stable areas. This is achieved using power systems protection techniques, 
as well as islanding techniques.  
 In order to determine if a locally unstable state variable (say, the frequency of one 
machine) can be recovered or is causing system separation that requires protective action, 
it is important to be able to see the local state variable’s trajectory with respect to other 
related state variables. This is most commonly expressed in power system operations as 
the bus voltage angle differences across pairs of important buses. This means that the 
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as the individual state variables. This can also be applied to products of individual 
variables, such as the magnitudes apparent power being products of measured voltages 
and currents. 
 Sensitivity theory, as described by Frank [4], defines the sensitivity coefficients as 
partial derivatives of the state variables with respect to the system parameters. If all 
derivatives exist, the following rules can be applied. 
( )1 2 1 2x x x x
α α α
∂ + ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
             (63) 
( )1 2 1 2
2 1(0) (0)
x x x xx x
α α α
∂ ∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂ ∂
         (64) 
 Where xi and xj are two state variables in the system and α is the system parameter 
of interest, and the derivatives on the right hand side of equations (63) and (64) exist. 
 With this in mind, the sensitivity coefficients of the angular separation (𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 =
𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺 − 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 ) and frequency separation (𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 ) can be calculated based on the 
previously calculated sensitivity coefficients of the individual angles and frequencies. 
This ability is important from a power systems protection standpoint, as the difference 
between bus angles is one of the key determinants of the power transfer between the 
buses, and the frequency difference between buses indicates whether the angles will 
further separate. There are several conventional and special protection schemes that 
explicitly monitor bus angles and frequencies, because large angle separation leads to the 
power system being unable to transfer power in a phenomenon known as out-of-step 
swing. 
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 The results shown in Figures 3.1 through 3.5 can then be modified to show the 
differences between machine angles and machine frequency deviations. The modified 
results are shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 below. 
 
Figure 3.6: Machine angle differences between pairs of generators in radians (top) and 
differences in frequency deviations in per-unit (bottom) with respect to time.  
3.7a – coefficients wrt. Y77 
 
3.7b – coefficients wrt. Y99 
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity coefficients with respect to bus 7 shunt admittance (3.7a) and bus 
9 shunt admittance (3.7b) for the simulation shown in Figure 3.6.  
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 From Figures 3.1 through 3.5, it can be seen that the power system stabilizes in 
the short term but with the frequency level settling below nominal there will be a shaft 
speed difference between the input mechanical torque and the rotor speed. Having 
different mechanical input speed and generator rotor speed is an unacceptable condition 
physically for most turbine operations. This is reflected in the frequency relay standard 
published by the IEEE and NERC regulations for maintaining system frequency [32]. 
 It can also be seen that the sensitivity coefficients of bus frequencies with respect 
to shunt admittances in Figures 3.5 and 3.7 have oscillating characteristics while the 
sensitivity coefficients with respect to mechanical power have a more stable 
characteristic. This suggests that changing the shunt admittances are not suitable for 
influencing the frequencies. However, the sensitivity coefficients of angles with respect 
to mechanical power appear to rise uncontrollably while the sensitivity coefficients of 
angles with respect to shunt admittances seem to have bounded responses. Figures 3.5 
and 3.7 indicate that the influence of Y77 diminishes to zero over time, while the 
influence of Y44 is an order of magnitude smaller than Y99. 
 Similar analyses of the sensitivity coefficients can be made for various 
disturbances and patterns of the coefficient characteristics coupled with the state variable 
responses can be used to determine the severity of the disturbance as well as determine 
the most influential system parameter that can be used to manipulate the state variables. 
 The example 9-bus system described above was further simulated and analyzed 
for several disturbance cases, and the results were compared and reviewed to see if any 
patterns emerge. A partial list of results is shown in Table 3.1 as follows. 
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Disturbance Case Angle and Frequency 
State Variable Responses 
Sensitivity Coefficient Reponses 
3-phase bus fault at bus 4 for 
2 cycles, reclose successful 
After initial pertubations, 
system recovers to 
different operating point. 
∂fij/∂Ykk and ∂δij/∂Ykk do not oscillate but 
some coefficients are unstable. 
Large load step-down, bus 5 
ωi settle above nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
above initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate but are offset from 0, 
∂δij/∂Ykk are large for Y77 and Y99. 
Large load step-down, bus 6 
ωi settle above nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
above initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate but are offset from 0, 
∂δij/∂Ykk are large and become unstable for 
Y77 and Y99. 
Large load step-down, bus 8 
ωi settle above nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
above initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate but are offset from 0, 
∂δij/∂Ykk are large and become unstable for 
Y77 and Y99. 
Large load step-up, bus 5  
ωi settle below nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
below initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate about 0, ∂δij/∂Ykk are 
small except for Y99. 
Large load step-up, bus 6 
ωi settle below nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
below initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate about 0, ∂δij/∂Ykk start 
out small except for Y99, but ∂δij/∂Y99 
diminishes after t=7s. 
Large load step-up, bus 8 
ωi settle below nominal, Vi 
is poorly damped but settle 
below initial points. 
∂fij/∂Ykk all oscillate about 0, ∂δij/∂Ykk are 
small except for Y99. 
Table 3.1: Comparison of state variables and sensitivity coefficients for various 
simulations. 
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3.2 Discussion of Results in Section 3.1 
Based on the results of the 9-bus example system, a few observations can be made 
about the sensitivity coefficients and the applications that can be used. 
3.2.1 Weakly linked parameter/variable pairs 
The sensitivity coefficients of systems that are mathematically weakly linked to 
the parameters of interest will become zero. This shows up in all the plots for field EMF 
(EFD) in all the cases. This is partly due to the nature of the field control and partly due to 
the assumptions taken in the calculations. It is important to note that this does not mean 
that EFD will not be affected by parameter changes, but only that the mathematical 
formulation has them weakly linked. 
The electrical properties at the buses (angles, frequencies) are more susceptible to 
changes in parameters that are closer to the buses of interest. In the 9 bus model the 
generators are too electrically far apart (admittances between generators are too high) for 
changes near one generator to greatly affect other generators. The coefficients are on the 
order of 10-9 per unit change in state variable per each unit change in parameters for 
devices that are far apart electrically, such as being separated by 2 or more buses with a 
large amount of impedances between them. 
3.2.2 Oscillating sensitivity coefficients exist 
During power swings there are coefficients that will swing about an axis either in-
phase or out-of-phase with the angle and frequency state variables. This is especially 
pronounced if the electrical machines are assumed to be operating as the Classical Model 
with a constant EMF and rotating mass. These coefficients are not immediately suitable 
55 
 
for protection or feedback applications because the latency of the real communication and 
data handling systems will result in any decisions made based on these coefficients will 
significantly lag the actual parameter in the system. Any application using these 
coefficients will have to be timed to take effect at the appropriate part of the swing. For 
example, in Figure 3.7, all three coefficients with respect to the system frequency 
oscillate about zero. The implication of this characteristic is that system latency can cause 
a decision based on a positive coefficient can be applied during the negative coefficient, 
and result in a reverse of the intended impact. 
3.3 TSA Coefficient Results for the IEEE 68-Bus System 
Two disturbances are simulated and analyzed for TSA coefficients: a three-phase 
fault at bus 60, and a line disconnection for one of the two parallel lines between buses 
60-61. The system network data are listed in Appendix A. The locations of these 
disturbances are selected since they both affect the power transfer and interconnection 
between Area #1 and Area #2 shown in Chapter 2, Figure 2.8.  
The two areas have two sets of double-circuited tie-lines, with the faulted bus in 
the 3-phase fault case located on one end of the tie line between buses 60-61 and the 
wind generator at bus 12 is in close proximity to the other tie line. Extended time 
simulation indicates that both the fault and a persistent disconnection of one of the 
parallel lines will eventually destabilize the system by degrading the ability to transfer 
power between Area #1 and Area #2. With the tie line near the fault diminished, the 
remaining tie line will gain a more important role in recovering the system operating 
conditions.  
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The other disturbance being investigated is a line trip that disconnects one line 
between buses 60-61. In the cases where the line is not reclosed, the system eventually 
separates, but in the case where the line is reclosed within a certain amount of time, the 
system will recover. 
 Figure 3.8 shows the angles across the three transmission lines that connect Area 
#1 and Area #2 in the IEEE 68-bus system in the three-phase fault case with no 
protection and with wind generation present. Figure 3.9 shows the angles across the 
transmission lines in the case where one of the two parallel lines between buses 60 and 61 
is tripped permanently. Figure 3.10 shows the angles across the lines in the case where 
the line in the previous case is tripped and then reclosed. 
 
Figure 3.8: Angle differences across three tie lines of the 3-phase fault at bus 60 case.  
 
Figure 3.9: Angle differences across three tie lines due to a permanent line trip on one of 
the parallel lines between buses 60-61.  
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Figure 3.10: Angle differences across three tie lines in the event of a permanent line trip 
on one of the parallel lines between buses 60-61.  
 From Figure 3.8, it can be seen that the short duration of the fault resulted in the 
angles across the tie lines eventually stabilizing, but in this case the voltage suppression 
in Area #1 where the fault occurs eventually collapse. Figures 3.9 and 3.10 compare two 
contrasting scenarios with the same line-tripping disturbance, where Figure 3.9 shows 
one step change in the simulation corresponding to the line trip and Figure 3.10 shows 
two step changes corresponding to the line trip and then the line reclosing.  
 The TSA coefficients were calculated for all three cases above, with the α-
parameter being the terminal voltage set-point (Vref) for the DFIGs at the two wind 
generators in the system.  By examining the sensitivity coefficients associated with the 
wind generator, it can be determined whether the wind generator can be used to improve 
operating conditions.The simulations for these two disturbances were run and analyzed in 
six cases as follows. 
Simulation Case A: 3-Phase Fault at bus 60, α-parameter studied for TSA coefficients is 
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fault is cleared quickly within 2 cycles, but the disturbance is severe enough to cause 
persistent tie line oscillations and eventual separation between the Areas 1 and 2. 
Simulation Case B: The same 3-Phase Fault at bus 60 as in case A, but with α-parameter 
studied for TSA coefficients is the Vref,DFIG2, the voltage control set-point for the wind 
turbine located at Bus 1. 
Simulation Case C: One of the parallel lines between buses 60 and 61 is permanently 
tripped, α-parameter studied for TSA coefficients is the Vref,DFIG1. In this simulation case, 
area #1 separates from the rest of the system. 
Simulation Case D: One of the parallel lines between buses 60 and 61 is permanently 
tripped, α-parameter studied for TSA coefficients is the Vref,DFIG2. 
Simulation Case E: One of the parallel lines between buses 60 and 61 is tripped and 
reclosed after 2 seconds, α-parameter studied for TSA coefficients is the Vref,DFIG1. This 
case and case F below are analyzed to contrast the two scenarios after the initial 
disturbance. In cases C and D, the line trips and does not reclose, while in cases E and F 
the line does reclose. 
Simulation Case F: One of the parallel lines between buses 60 and 61 is tripped and 
reclosed after 2 seconds, α-parameter studied for TSA coefficients is the Vref,DFIG2.  
In all of the cases above, the simulation applies the disturbance at 1 second, and is 
run for 10 seconds. The TSA coefficients for state variable sensitivities with respect to 
the corresponding α-parameter are calculated and examined. The resulting matrix 
dimensions of these sensitivities are 129×k for w1 and 207×k for w2, where k is the 
number of simulation time steps. Due to the large numbers of these coefficients, the 
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results are not presented here in full. However the most sensitive variables and their 
characteristics are presented in Table 3.2 through Table 3.5. 
Type Description Representative Example Plot 
Result 
Type 1 
A spike in sensitivity occurs immediately after 
the time of the disturbance and oscillates 
noticeably (spikes on both positive and negative 
values), but also quickly damps down to zero or 
oscillates near-zero. Damping time is less than 
0.5 seconds.      
Result 
Type 2 
Sensitivity coefficients oscillate within a 
consistent zone, offset below zero (negative 
value in the vast majority of the plot).  
     
Result 
Type 3 
Sensitivity coefficients oscillate within a 
consistent zone, offset above zero (positive 
value in the vast majority of the plot). 
     
Result 
Type 4 
Sensitivity coefficients oscillate around zero 
(may be skewed towards positive or negative 
values). 
     
Result 
Type 5 
A spike in sensitivity occurs immediately after 
the time of the disturbance and oscillates (spikes 
on either positive or negative values), but also 
immediately damps down to zero or oscillates 
near-zero. Damping time is less than 0.5 
seconds.      
Table 3.2: Summary of the characteristics of the sensitivity coefficients of the variables 
for cases A-F. 
After completing the simulations and analyzing the results it became clear that the 
sensitivity coefficients will exhibit characteristics that can be grouped together. These 
types of characteristics are summarized in Table 3.2. The types and categories shown 
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here are defined for the purposes of convenience only and do not reflect a standardized 
definition as none exists at this time for TSA analysis in power systems. 
 CASE A, Fault @ Bus 60 
α = Vref,DFIG1 
CASE B, Fault @ Bus 60 
α = Vref,DFIG2 
System State 
Variable  
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Vr1,Exc1 0.8254 Type 1 -0.9496 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc2 0.6581 Type 1 -0.7582 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc3 0.1589 Type 1 -0.1816 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc4 -0.1065 Type 1 -0.1232 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc5 0.1525 Type 1 -0.1759 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc6 0.1190 Type 1 -0.1374 Type 1 
Vr1,Exc7 -0.2631 Type 1 -0.3015 Type 1 
Idr,DFIG1 (bus 12) -0.1413 Type 2 - - 
Iqr,DFIG1 (bus 12)  - - 0.0694 Type 5 
Idr,DFIG2 (bus 1)  - - -0.1410 Type 2 
Iqr,DFIG2 (bus 1) 0.2170 Type 1 0.2606 Type 5 
System 
Output  
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Pelec,Gen2 - - 0.0544 Type 3 
Pelec,Gen3 0.2459 Type 4 0.1671 Type 4 
Vf,Gen7 -0.0821 Type 1 -0.0580 Type 1 
Qelec,Gen7 - - 0.0660 Type 1 
Vf,Gen8 0.0649 Type 1 - - 
Pelec,Gen8 -0.0552 Type 4 - - 
Pelec,Gen13 - - 0.0482 Type 3 
Table 3.3: Summary of the most sensitive system variables and outputs for Case A (Fault 
@ Bus 60, α = Vref,DFIG1) and for Case B (α = Vref,DFIG2). 
System State 
Variable  
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Idr,DFIG1 (bus 12)  -0.3274 Type 2   
Idr,DFIG2 (bus 1)    -0.1606 Type 2 
System 
Output 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Pelec,Gen3   -0.0546 Type 4 
Qelec,Gen3 -0.2215 Type 2   
Pelec,Gen13   0.0394 Type 3 
Table 3.4: Summary of the most sensitive system variables and outputs for Case C (Trip 
@ Line 60-61, α = Vref,DFIG1) and for Case D (α = Vref,DFIG2). 
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System 
State 
Variable  
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Idr,DFIG1 (bus 
12)  
-0.1796 Type 2   
Idr,DFIG2 (bus 1)    -0.1320 Type 2 
System 
Output 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Maximum/Minimum 
Sensitivity Coefficient 
Value 
Characteristic 
Type 
Pelec,Gen3   0.0667 Type 4 
Qelec,Gen3 -0.2215 Type 2   
Table 3.5: A summary of the most sensitive system variables and outputs for Case E 
(Trip @ Line 60-61 with reclose, α = Vref,DFIG1) and for Case F (α = Vref,DFIG2). 
3.4 Discussion of Results in Section 3.3 
 The tables above indicate that the internal variables of some AVRs (Vr1) can have 
large magnitude sensitivity coefficients with respect to the DFIG voltage set-point, but 
these coefficients are also quickly damped out (all Type 1). This is consistent with 
observations and derivations made in [4] with respect to the sensitivities of the variables 
in a well-damped system. A stably controlled subsystem will tend to drive its own 
internal states to a stable point and therefore exhibit small values for sensitivity 
coefficients.  
 This analysis is intended to evaluate whether TSA is suitable for security 
assessment, and the plotted shapes of the calculated coefficients indicate that the state 
variables of the AVRs by themselves are not suitable candidates for determining the 
stability or security of a power system. The reasoning is twofold. First, the variables are 
quickly damped and only spike during large disturbances which does not exhibit 
noticeable changes during oscillations in the system. Second, these variables are internal 
to a model representation of the AVRs, which means that they cannot be directly 
62 
 
measured and additional state estimation would be required to estimate their values from 
measurable variables such as terminal voltages or field voltages.  Lastly, when the 
disturbance is not a fault or does not suppress voltages, the magnitudes of these 
sensitivities are no longer among the highest, which is why they do not appear on Tables 
3.3 through 3.5. 
 The sensitivity coefficients of the DFIG generator q-axis current, d-axis current, 
and synchronous machine real and reactive power are variables that can be either directly 
measured or estimated using relatively simple pseudo-measurements, and present more 
interesting opportunities for expanding the research in utilizing TSA in power systems. 
The sensitivity coefficients of these variables usually exhibit low-frequency oscillatory 
characteristics, with no offset or an offset above or below zero. The difference between 
fast-damping and slow-oscillating coefficients is illustrated in Figure 3.11. 
For the exact same disturbance, analyzing the sensitivity coefficients with respect 
to two different α-parameters can yield interesting observations. This is illustrated by 
reviewing the coefficients with respect to Vref,DFIG1 and Vref,DFIG2, as shown Figures 3.12 
and 3.13. 
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Figure 3.11: Sensitivity coefficients of exciter Vr1 at AVR1 (top), DFIG q-axis current 
(middle) and d-axis current (bottom) with respect to the DFIG terminal voltage setting 
Vref,DFIG2. Plots taken from Case B. 
 
Figure 3.12: Sensitivity coefficient of DFIG1 d-axis rotor current (top) and G3 reactive 
power (bottom) with respect to Vref,DFIG1. Simulated Case C. 
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Figure 3.13: Sensitivity coefficient of DFIG2 q-axis rotor current (top) and real power 
output from G3 (middle) and G13 (bottom) with respect to Vref,DFIG2. Simulated Case D 
The comparison between simulation cases with the same disturbance but different 
α-parameters is useful for determining which general zones of the power system are 
subject to more severe instability, and provides clues as to which areas of the power 
system would benefit more from corrective or preventive control actions. For example, 
the sensitivities of real power at two synchronous generators shown in Fig. 3.12 are 
beginning to trend towards instability (under-damped), which suggests that the power 
transfer within the system is becoming unstable. This can be compared to the simulation 
cases where the same conditions as those shown in Fig. 3.12 and 3.13, but with a 
successful reclose of the tripped line.  
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Figure 3.14 shows the same sensitivity coefficients as the ones shown in Figure 
3.12, except that for simulation case C the tripped line does not reclose while the 
simulation case E recloses. The plots in these two cases have the same general 
characteristics, but the plots in Figure 3.12 trend away from the starting values while the 
plots in Figure 3.14 appear to be bounded. The plots of Figures 3.13 and 3.15 can be 
compared to analyze the differences in responses between a case where the disturbance is 
not reclosed (Figure 3.13) and the case where the disturbance is reclosed (Figure 3.15). 
The perturbations in the cases with reclosing appear to return to stability sooner or have 
smaller deflection between minimum and maximum. 
 
Figure 3.14: Sensitivity coefficient of DFIG1 d-axis rotor current (top) and reactive 
power output of G3 (bottom) with respect to Vref,DFIG1. Simulated Case E. 
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Figure 3.15: Sensitivity coefficient of DFIG2 d-axis rotor current (top) and real power 
output from G3 (bottom) with respect to Vref,DFIG2 (Case F). 
The interactions between DFIG variables, either within the same DFIG or 
between different DFIGs in the power system, can be analyzed to determine possible 
relationships that may affect control or protection considerations. In Figure 3.16, the 
cross-sensitivities, variables of one DFIG w.r.t. the other DFIG (such as 
∂iqr,DFIG1/∂Vref,DFIG2) of the DFIG d-axis currents are presented. In contrast, Figure 3.17 
shows the self-sensitivities of the d-axis currents. Similar comparison plots of the DFIG 
q-axis currents are shown in Figures 3.18 and 3.19.  
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Figure 3.16: Sensitivity coefficients ∂idr,DFIG1/∂Vref,DFIG2 and ∂idr,DFIG2/∂Vref,DFIG1, in the 3-
phase fault case. 
The idr and iqr sensitivities can be analyzed further by examining the mathematical 
models of the respective machines. The model of each DFIG corresponds to equations 
(55) through (60) in Chapter 2, with (58) governing the iqr behavior and (59) governing 
idr. When extracting the relevant sub-equations from the partial derivatives shown in 
equations (6) and (7) after substituting the model equations in (58) and (59), the solutions 
for ∂idr/∂Vref,DFIG will have the general form of a differential equation with ∂F/∂idr terms, 
∂G/∂idr terms, ∂F/∂Vref,DFIG terms, and other mutual terms cross-coupled to the other 
system variables and outputs. The same principle applies in the iqr cases. 
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Figure 3.17: Sensitivity coefficient of each DFIG d-axis current with respect to the DFIG 
terminal voltage setting Vref,DFIG of the same DFIG, in the 3-phase fault case. 
By further evaluating the equations, the time differential of ∂iqr/∂Vref,DFIG and 
∂idr/∂Vref,DFIG contain terms that are multiplied by the DFIG terminal voltage after the 
calculated power is decomposed into iqr and idr parts, but only ∂idr/∂Vref,DFIG contains a 
constant term from ∂F/∂Vref,DFIG. 
These differences in the solutions resulted in the difference in responses shown in 
Figures 3.16 through 3.19. The coefficient ∂iqr/∂Vref,DFIG has the largest magnitude when 
the voltage is suppressed, and returns to a small value as soon as the voltage recovers. On 
the other hand, ∂idr/∂Vref,DFIG has a similarly sudden change due to the DFIG terminal 
voltage presences in the differential equations, but has a steady-state value based on the 
constant term in the partial differential which is scaled by other operating conditions.  
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Figure 3.18: Sensitivity coefficient of each DFIG q-axis current with respect to the DFIG 
terminal voltage setting Vref,DFIG of the other DFIG, in the 3-phase fault case. 
 
Figure 3.19: Sensitivity coefficient of each DFIG q-axis current with respect to the DFIG 
terminal voltage setting Vref,DFIG of the same DFIG, in the 3-phase fault case. 
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For comparison with the 3-phase fault case, Figures 3.20 and 3.21 shows the same 
plots for the line trip disturbance, where the disturbance does not include voltage 
suppression. When voltage suppression does not occur during the disturbance, the 
dominant components of the ∂iqr/∂Vref,DFIG coefficients disappear and the remaining 
values have smaller magnitudes on the order of 10-3. 
 
Figure 3.20: Sensitivity coefficient of each DFIG d-axis current with respect to the DFIG 
terminal voltage setting Vref,DFIG of the other DFIG (top 2 plots) and same DFIG (bottom 
2 plots), in the line trip case. 
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Figure 3.21: Sensitivity coefficient of each DFIG q-axis current with respect to the DFIG 
terminal voltage setting Vref,DFIG of the other DFIG (top 2 plots) and of the same DFIG 
(bottom 2 plots), in the line trip case. 
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3.5 Apparent Impedances in Cases Discussed in 3.4  
The output data from the time domain PSAT simulation includes bus voltages and 
bus voltage angles. The apparent impedance at various points can be calculated using the 
voltage and line data all in per-unit [33]. Equation (65) shows the phasor calculation of 
the apparent impedance at bus i, as seen by a relay protecting the line between buses i-j. 
( ),
i iji
app iij
ij i j
V ZVZ
I V V
= =
−
           (65) 
 
Figure 3.22: Apparent impedances in the 3-phase fault case – (a) bus 53 looking into line 
53-54; (b) bus 54, line 53-54; (c) bus 61, line 61-60; (d) bus 60, line 61-60. 
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Figure 3.23: Apparent impedances in the line trip fault case – (a) bus 53 looking into line 
53-54; (b) bus 54, line 53-54; (c) bus 61, line 61-60; (d) bus 60, line 61-60. 
Figure 3.22 in the previous page shows the apparent impedance plots in the case 
of a 3-phase fault as seen from the four buses on both ends of two of the main tie lines 
between Area #1 and Area #2. The corresponding plots from the case where one of the 
two lines between buses 60-61 is tripped.  
The straight line in each of the plot marked with “ZLine” represents the 
impedance of the transmission line connected to the bus. In Figures 3.22 (a) and (b) the 
plots reflect the impedance seen by relays at buses 53 and 54. Since the 53-54 line is not 
involved with the fault, the apparent impedance only reflects the angle and voltage 
fluctuations. On the other hand, Figures 3.22 (c) and (d) show the apparent impedance on 
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the faulted bus (60) and the bus on the other end of a line connected to the faulted bus 
(61). The apparent impedances in these cases immediately shows the effect of the fault 
where the impedance drops sharply and the calculated impedance in 3.22 (c) and (d) 
move to areas associated visually with the impedance of the line before entering the 
recovery oscillation. 
 The apparent impedances for the line trip case in Figure 41 show what unstable 
swings and system separations look like. The apparent impedances all swing in towards 
the line impedance and do not recover. This is further illustrated in Figure 3.24 which 
expands the time frame of Figure 3.9 to the time period where the instability becomes 
very obvious. 
 
Figure 3.24: Plots of angle differences from Figure 3.9, but with extended simulation 
time to illustrate the instability.  
 The conditions in which the power system do not recover and the apparent 
impedances obviously approach a zone near the transmission line impedance are 
conditions that are suitable candidates for out-of-step relaying, which would make these 
cases the basis for the following chapter where a normal out-of-step relay setting is 
determine and then the special protection scheme using TSA will be added to improve the 
out-of-step protection performance and improve the system response to disturbances. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OUT-OF-STEP SETTINGS AND SPECIAL PROTECTION SCHEME 
 This chapter begins with the establishment of normal out-of-step relay settings for 
the transmission tie lines presented in Chapter 3. The settings will be based on the 
recommendations in Blackburn and Domin [30]. The process starts with determining 
basic distance relay settings [30] which would provide the protection setting perimeter 
that guides the out-of-step (OOS) settings. The OOS settings will in turn be evaluated 
against the apparent impedance plots from the disturbances discussed at the end of 
Chapter 3. This evaluation will then lead to the determination of the special protection 
settings and the chapter will be concluded with the simulation result after implementing 
the special protection scheme. 
4.1 Out-of-Step Relay Settings 
The OOS relay settings require the settings of standard distance relays to be 
established for detecting regular faults in order for the OOS settings to have a perimeter 
where the OOS relay should not encroach.  If the OOS relay characteristics overlap with 
the distance relays, then there is a chance that the combination of the two protection types 
may operate incorrectly. These conditions can be tested and ameliorated by using 
blocking logic to prevent incorrect operation.  
 4.1.1 Distance Relay Setting 
 There are no standardized rules for setting distance relays, and each utility or 
regulatory entity has to be responsible for establishing a protection philosophy and 
settings guidelines. The settings are then studied internally to ensure that they are 
76 
 
properly coordinated and subsequently submitted to the applicable regulatory body. The 
distance relays in this case will follow the general recommendations from Blackburn and 
Domin [30], which is 90% of the impedance value of the transmission line for the 
primary zone, and 150% of the line for the back-up zone. The distance relay zones are 
shown in Figures 4.1, which only show the distance relay characteristics from the Area 
#1 side of each line. 
 
Figure 4.1: Distance relay settings for the Area #1 side of two of the main tie lines in the 
IEEE 68-bus system. (a) shows the setting for a relay at bus 54 looking into line 54-53; 
(b) shows bus 60 looking into line 60-61. 
4.1.2 Incorporating Out-of-Step Relay  
The relay settings shown in Figure 43 will be coordinated with the OOS relay 
settings in order to avoid failure to trip for faults with low current and to avoid tripping 
incorrectly when the power swing is stable. Discussions on these settings and trip/bloc 
logics can be found in Blackburn and Domin [30] as well as Anderson [12]. This process 
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starts with evaluating the disturbances against the distance relay settings, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Distance relay settings from Figure 4.1 with the disturbance impedances 
superimposed. 
 From the perspective of a relay at bus 54 in Figure 4.1 (a), the fault that occurs at 
bus 60 doesn’t register near the protection zones at all, because the fault occurs too far 
away from the bus to significantly influence its voltage or current flow. Bus 60 in Figure 
4.2 (b) will see the fault slightly behind the relay because of the line shunt admittances 
and simulated fault impedance slightly distorting the measurements. If the fault is an 
ideal short circuit the impedance plot will approach the (0,0) coordinate in 4.2 (b). 
 Since the apparent impedances in both cases approach the protection zones from 
the positive reactance area of the plots, simply using a blinder as shown in Figure 2.14 in 
Chapter 2 may not be suitable because the blinder lines to the positive and negative 
resistance sides may not adequately cover swings when the line loading becomes reactive 
such as in Figure 4.2. Therefore, the OOS protection zones will be established as circles 
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that are concentric with the zone 2 (larger circles) of the distance relays, with twice the 
radii of the zone 2 settings. 
 
Figure 4.3: Distance relay settings from Figure 4.1 with the OOS zones added. 
Another crucial element of OOS protection is time, specifically the time delays 
applied in order to allow other protection elements operate and the timing of the blocking 
signal such that the OOS can block the distance relay from operating until the stability of 
the swing is confirmed. The resistances and reactances of the unstable swing case (plots 
with “+” symbols) from Figure 4.3 are separated and plotted with respect to time in order 
to check the timing of the OOS zone encroachments. This plot is compressed to show the 
time period near the unstable condition in Figure 4.4 in the next page. 
 After evaluating the timing and the impedance plots in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, it 
becomes apparent that the unstable swing will develop at the bus near the disturbance 
first (bus 60) and escalates slowly until the system is no longer able to support the power 
flows. The bus further away from the disturbance (bus 54) will begin its swing after some 
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time has elapsed as the effects of the disturbance make their way across the system, and 
then once the stability threshold is reached, the swings destabilize quickly. 
 
Figure 4.4: Apparent resistances (top) and reactance (bottom) plotted against time in the 
unstable swing cases. 
Since the unstable swing at bus 54 is a consequence of the disturbance at bus 60 
propagating throughout the system, the remainder of this analysis will focus on bus 60. 
As described by Anderson [12], a basic logic diagram of the OOS relay tripping and 
blocking scheme is shown in Figure 4.5 on the next page. Once the OOS zone is 
encroached, the normally open contact “OOS” in Figure 4.5 closes, energizing the OS 
timer, which in turn will delay the protection sequence in order to allow stable swings to 
exit the zone. If the swing stays within the OOS zone and the time delay is exhausted, 
and zone 2 of the distance relay (contact 21-2) is tripped and initiates the AR contact, 
then the next time delay (T1) is initiated, once again giving the power swing a chance to 
10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
R
el
ay
 R
es
is
ta
nc
e,
 p
.u
.
Time, Sec.
 
 
RBUS54
RBUS60
10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
R
el
ay
 R
ea
ct
an
ce
, p
.u
.
Time, Sec.
 
 
XBUS54
XBUS60
Distance Relay Zone 2 
OOS Relay 
 
Distance Relay Zone 2 
OOS Relay 
 
80 
 
exit the zone. If the power swing stays within the zones, then none of the time delays will 
reset causing the circuit breaker contact (52) to trip. The device designations are based on 
generic standard conventions [34]. 
+ CONTROL VOLTAGE
- CONTROL VOLTAGE
Normally 
Closed 
Contact
Normally 
Open 
Contact
Timer or 
Relay 
Coil
OOS
OS
T2T1
OS OS
AR AR
T1
21-2
OS TR
T2
52TRAR
  
Figure 4.5: Out-of-Step Relay trip/block logic diagram.  
 Based on the relay zone settings and the time plot in Figure 4.4, the apparent 
impedance at bus 60 will enter the OOS zone at 12.89 seconds and the distance relay 
zone 2 at 13.24 seconds. This means that the timer T1 has to have a drop-off time of at 
least 350 milliseconds otherwise this unstable swing will be incorrectly blocked. 
4.2 Updating Out-of-Step Relay Settings With TSA Considerations 
 After further reviewing the simulation results details, it is determined that the 
instability of the line 60-61 in the line tripping case is due to the inability of Area #2 to 
transfer reactive power to Area #1. Before the line trip, Area #1 has been receiving real 
and reactive power from Area #2. Therefore, the medial actions for this condition will 
begin with various methods to either reduce the power consumption requirements in Area 
#1 or to increase real or reactive power production in Area #1. Simply trying to push 
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more power through the remaining lines carries the risk of overloading the other lines and 
tripping other relays that further damage the system. 
 Load shedding is the term used for disconnecting loads in order to maintain the 
integrity of the overall system. Increasing real power will require changing set points on 
the local generators in order to drive more power into the system. Increasing reactive 
power may be accomplished by changing AVR outputs at the generators or, if available, 
bring reactive power sources such as switched shunts or synchronous condensers online. 
 The OOS protection logic can then be enhanced with TSA by taking the following 
steps. First, identify a TSA-based remedial action scheme (RAS) trip zone, which acts 
like a further outer ring of protection zone outside of the OOS zone. When apparent 
impedances reach this zone, the remedial actions available in the system may be 
triggered. Second, the TSA RAS contact will have a time delay similar to the OOS delay 
in order to allow the system to recover naturally if possible. Third, the TSA RAS will 
delay the OOS timer starting time in order to allow the RAS to take effect. The logic 
diagram is updated in Figure 4.6 in the next page. The zone setting for the RAS zone is 
arbitrarily selected at three times the OOS zone. 
+ CONTROL VOLTAGE
- CONTROL VOLTAGE
OOS
OS
T2
OS
OS
AR AR
T1
21-2
OS TR
T2
52TRAR
OSB
RAS
T1OSB
T3
RAk
RAOk
T3
RA2
RAO2
T3
RA1
RAO1
T3
T3
 
Figure 4.6: Out-of-Step Relay trip/block logic diagram updated with RAS.  
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Figure 4.7: Relay settings from Figure 4.3 with the RAS zone added. 
 From Figure 4.6, the RAS contact is triggered when the apparent impedance 
reaches the RAS zone, outermost circle in Figure 4.7. The T3 timer then initiates a time 
delay in order to allow the swing to exit the zone within the allotted time. If the power 
swing stays within the zone, the remedial actions (RA) are initiated. There may be several 
remedial actions, so each parallel branch represents an RA option. Each of the RA 
contacts also have a normally closed “remedial action is available” (RAO) contact, 
designed to receive device status flags from the RA devices. For example, if a capacitor 
bank is already online, then sending a further trip signal to try to bring it online will result 
in no further action to support the system. The final part of the RAS block is the OSB 
contact that sends a blocking signal to the OOS protection.  
Internal logic is added to ensure the blocking signal is removed if the RAs are not 
available, and the order of RA choices is based on the magnitudes of the TSA 
coefficients. This is done in a trial-and-error manner, because there are no set 
 
 
 
   
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(b
) R
el
ay
 R
ea
ct
an
ce
, p
.u
.
(b) Relay Resistance, p.u.
RAS Zone
OOS Zone
Bus 60
83 
 
methodologies for determining the most effective way to compare TSA coefficients with 
the goal of selecting control actions. Adding to this complication is the fact that there are 
several possible α-parameter choices, depending on the types of devices available in the 
system.  
 For the specific case (cases C & D from Chapter 3), the voltage set-point of the 
wind turbine does not provide sufficient information for selecting a remedial action, so 
simulations were run to evaluate a few additional α-parameters, including a switched 
shunt at bus 59 near the fault point, the generator power and reactive power outputs at a 
nearby synchronous machine at bus 2, and changes to a load connected near the same 
generator which is approximated by the ratio of power coming from the generator.  These 
results are summarized in Table 4.1 below. 
Variable  α = PGen,Bus2 α = QGen,Bus2 
θ60 7.9x10-3 7.5x10-3 
θ61 9.5x10-3 8.5x10-3 
θ60-θ61 -2x10-3 -1x10-3 
Table 4.1: Summary of the maximum values of the tie line angle sensitivities compared 
to choices of α.   
Based on Table 4.1, the RAS is implemented by shedding the load close to the 
generator at bus 2, as well as adding reactive power to the generator at the same bus. The 
tie line angles are shown in Figure 4.8, and the apparent impedance plot is shown in 
Figure 4.9 on the next page. The figures show some improvements in the tie line angles, 
which seems to converge to a lower angle difference than the cases without RAS or OOS. 
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Figure 4.8: Tie line angles in the RAS case. 
 
Figure 4.9: Bus 60 apparent impedances in the RAS case compared to no RAS. 
 Figure 4.9 shows that in the case where there is RAS operating the apparent 
impedance will swing back towards the original operating point before reaching the out-
of-step relay zone. This means that the integrity of the tie line can be preserved at least 
for a longer period of time while other devices work to return balance to the system. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Trajectory Sensitivity Analysis 
This dissertation studied the influences of system parameters on the responses of 
other variables within the power system using TSA. An algorithm was achieved in the 
MATLAB environment based on a pre-existing power system dynamic simulation 
extended to handle the calculation of TSA coefficients. The proposed algorithm was then 
tested on the modified IEEE 68-bus system with different disturbances. The results 
illustrated the set of system variables that are the most sensitive to the α-parameter, which 
indicates the possibilities in influencing the state variables during disturbances by making 
adjustments to the α-parameter.  
Based on the plots in the figures in Chapter 3, it can be inferred that adjusting the 
α-parameters associated with the DFIG will have limited influence on rest of the system. 
However, the α-parameter will have effects on the DFIG variables of the same machine 
which can be seen from analyzing the differential equations. On the other hand, changes 
to other candidate α-parameters can have effects on some of the state variables and 
system outputs that would in turn change the conditions in the system in such a way that 
system stability can be promoted. 
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5.2 Special Protection Scheme 
Based on principles outlined by Frank [4], it is also possible to design controllers 
and remedial action schemes driven by TSA coefficients. The sensitivity coefficients can 
be used to determine which variables or combinations of variables are the most sensitive 
with respect to a controllable α-parameter and therefore become the target of control or 
remedial actions. Preventive protection schemes are used to extract value from TSA 
coefficients. This may be achieved by using TSA to analyze whether the protective 
actions will achieve the intended consequences, as well as check whether unintended or 
undesired consequences will occur. The results of the initial evaluations were 
incorporated into setting up a special protection scheme that is based on added a layer of 
TSA-driven remedial actions to an existing out-of-step relaying protection scheme. 
 The main off-line part of the scheme is the selection of corrective actions once the 
detection part of the scheme sends the request for corrective action. Each candidate for 
corrective action has two aspects that will be evaluated for use: the efficacy of the action, 
and the availability of the action. The efficacy of the action can be determined directly 
from the sensitivity coefficients which indicate an approximate relationship between the 
system variables and the α-parameters.  
 The merits of the special protection scheme will be determined by the amount of 
power system resources that can be saved, and the amount of customer loads that can be 
saved. If the special protection scheme can increase the stability of the system or reduce 
the amount of load losses compared to conventional protection, then this scheme will be a 
candidate for further comparison to other protection schemes. In practice, the choice of 
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special protection schemes will usually be determined by the amount of investment 
required to implement them, and the costs they impose upon the operation of the power 
system. 
 After completing the simulations and applying the protection schemes, it was 
demonstrated that adding the remedial action scheme can provide value to the power 
system in the events where out-of-step protection or unstable swings may occur.  The 
remedial action scheme is purposefully chosen to be tripped much sooner than the out-of-
step relay in order to afford the remedial action to take effect. In the end, the new special 
protection scheme functions as an early warning and early corrective action driver for the 
power system. 
5.3 Practical Considerations 
 The sensitivity coefficients are calculated based on the state variable relationships 
such as the examples presented above. However, practical power systems in operation 
often do not measure the state variables directly. In modern power system control and 
management, the measured quantities usually include bus voltage magnitudes and angles, 
line current magnitudes and angles, bus frequencies, and power flow through equipment. 
These items are often measured and sampled at long intervals (1+ seconds) for state 
estimators. Recent developments have incorporated PMU outputs at faster measurement 
report rates, at 30 to 120 measurements per second, or once every 0.5 to 2 cycles. 
 For this proposed scheme, in order to make the application feasible in real-world 
applications the TSA calculations will have to be able to work with the measurements 
that are available, which are almost never all the measurements desired under ideal 
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circumstances. Furthermore, PMUs have the ability to include digital information and 
custom analog messages, which can be leveraged to improve the TSA analysis. 
 In order to make the special protection scheme effective, a more complete or 
automated TSA analysis must be performed by cycling through all the available system 
parameters. This dissertation has simplified the outcome by focusing on one subset of 
disturbances at particular areas within the power system, and focused on system 
parameters that are traditionally associated with existing methods of returning the system 
to stability.  
Power system protection schemes are often described as an art as much as a 
science, because each power system has different characteristics and respond to 
disturbances differently, even in the same system from different operating conditions. 
The special protection scheme proposed in this dissertation is a new tool that may be used 
to cover blind spots or unexpected system responses by adding an element of sensitivity 
study in order to estimate possible effects of the actions that can be taken. 
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APPENDIX A 
IEEE 68-BUS TEST SYSTEM DATA 
 The IEEE 68-bus test system data is based primarily on the information published 
by Kundur [28], but additional dynamic model information is added here for the wind 
turbine generators. Table A.1 includes the bus data including initial condition voltages 
and angles as well as bus type. PV buses are buses with power sources (generators) with 
voltage control, PQ buses are buses with only specified loads or sources without voltage 
control, and the Slack bus is the bus with the reference voltage. Table A.2 includes the 
transmission line and transformer data.  
BUS# kV Rating 
Initial 
Voltage 
Initial 
Angle BUS# 
kV 
Rating 
Initial 
Voltage 
Initial 
Angle 
1 20 1.000 33.89 35 230 0.889 14.43 
2 20 1.000 38.97 36 230 0.927 7.71 
3 20 1.000 42.28 37 230 0.922 32.38 
4 20 1.000 46.16 38 230 0.927 27.58 
5 20 1.000 44.94 39 230 0.878 -1.74 
6 20 1.000 49.06 40 230 0.903 35.25 
7 20 1.000 51.59 41 230 0.995 65.89 
8 20 1.000 40.91 42 230 0.997 58.08 
9 20 1.000 48.86 43 230 0.900 -1.80 
10 20 1.000 35.83 44 230 0.898 -1.76 
11 20 1.000 35.95 45 230 0.886 15.03 
12 20 1.000 14.23 46 230 0.916 31.05 
13 20 1.000 0.00 47 230 0.910 25.76 
14 20 1.000 67.43 48 230 0.906 27.91 
15 20 1.000 58.94 49 230 0.919 37.22 
16 20 1.000 62.64 50 230 0.911 35.12 
17 230 0.937 -2.70 51 230 0.894 19.81 
18 230 0.977 55.59 52 230 0.918 30.67 
19 230 0.931 40.25 53 230 0.918 25.44 
 Table A.1: IEEE 68-bus system bus data.  
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BUS# kV Rating 
Initial 
Voltage 
Initial 
Angle BUS# 
kV 
Rating 
Initial 
Voltage 
Initial 
Angle 
20 100 0.943 39.01 54 230 0.937 31.05 
21 230 0.921 37.10 55 230 0.918 29.28 
22 230 0.949 42.85 56 230 0.896 29.16 
23 230 0.953 42.46 57 230 0.892 28.78 
24 230 0.926 34.04 58 230 0.894 29.59 
25 230 0.958 33.24 59 230 0.884 25.99 
26 230 0.947 34.26 60 230 0.885 24.94 
27 230 0.937 33.22 61 230 0.902 17.39 
28 230 0.949 38.08 62 230 0.902 33.41 
29 230 0.956 41.24 63 230 0.897 32.12 
30 230 0.916 23.39 64 230 0.929 32.36 
31 230 0.928 27.45 65 230 0.899 32.75 
32 230 0.939 27.67 66 230 0.898 31.27 
33 230 0.932 22.68 67 230 0.899 31.66 
34 230 0.938 14.21 68 230 0.918 33.82 
Table A.1: IEEE 68-bus system bus data. (Continued) 
From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Rated 
MVA 
Rated 
KV 
Line 
Resistance 
Line 
Reactance 
Shunt 
Admittance 
67 68 100 230 0.0009 0.0094 0.0855 
66 67 100 230 0.0018 0.0217 0.183 
65 66 100 230 0.0009 0.0101 0.08615 
63 62 100 230 0.0004 0.0043 0.03645 
53 54 100 230 0.0035 0.0411 0.34935 
59 58 100 230 0.0006 0.0092 0.0565 
58 57 100 230 0.0002 0.0026 0.0217 
62 65 100 230 0.0004 0.0043 0.03645 
60 57 100 230 0.0008 0.0112 0.0738 
59 60 100 230 0.0004 0.0046 0.039 
19 68 100 230 0.0016 0.0195 0.152 
57 56 100 230 0.0008 0.0128 0.0671 
56 55 100 230 0.0013 0.0213 0.1107 
66 56 100 230 0.0008 0.0129 0.0691 
52 37 100 230 0.0007 0.0082 0.06595 
37 27 100 230 0.0013 0.0173 0.2655 
52 55 100 230 0.0011 0.0133 0.1069 
55 54 100 230 0.0013 0.0151 0.1286 
Table A.2: IEEE 68-bus system branch data. 
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From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Rated 
MVA 
Rated 
KV 
Line 
Resistance 
Line 
Reactance 
Shunt 
Admittance 
25 26 100 230 0.0032 0.0323 0.2655 
55 54 100 230 0.0013 0.0151 0.1286 
54 25 100 230 0.007 0.0086 0.073 
25 26 100 230 0.0032 0.0323 0.2655 
27 26 100 230 0.0014 0.0147 0.1198 
68 21 100 230 0.0008 0.0135 0.1274 
28 29 100 230 0.0014 0.0151 0.1245 
26 28 100 230 0.0043 0.0474 0.3901 
26 29 100 230 0.0057 0.0625 0.5145 
42 41 100 230 0.004 0.06 1.125 
41 40 100 230 0.006 0.084 1.575 
18 42 100 230 0.004 0.06 1.125 
18 50 100 230 0.0012 0.0288 0.2575 
50 51 100 230 0.0009 0.0221 0.81 
51 45 100 230 0.0004 0.0105 0.36 
49 46 100 230 0.0018 0.0274 0.135 
68 24 100 230 0.0003 0.0059 0.034 
46 38 100 230 0.0022 0.0284 0.215 
38 33 100 230 0.0036 0.0444 0.3465 
31 38 100 230 0.0011 0.0147 0.1235 
39 45 100 230 0 0.0839 0 
39 44 100 230 0 0.0411 0 
43 44 100 230 0.0001 0.0011 0 
43 17 100 230 0.0005 0.0276 0 
36 61 100 230 0.0022 0.0196 0.17 
36 61 100 230 0.0022 0.0196 0.17 
63 58 100 230 0.0007 0.0082 0.06945 
23 22 100 230 0.0006 0.0096 0.0923 
60 61 100 230 0.0023 0.0363 0.1902 
61 30 100 230 0.0019 0.0183 0.145 
61 30 100 230 0.0019 0.0183 0.145 
32 30 100 230 0.0024 0.0288 0.244 
30 53 100 230 0.0008 0.0074 0.24 
30 31 100 230 0.0013 0.0187 0.1665 
Table A.2: IEEE 68-bus system line data. (Continued) 
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From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Rated 
MVA 
Rated 
KV 
Line 
Resistance 
Line 
Reactance 
Shunt 
Admittance 
33 32 100 230 0.0008 0.0099 0.084 
34 33 100 230 0.0011 0.0157 0.101 
34 36 100 230 0.0033 0.0111 0.725 
45 35 100 230 0.0007 0.0175 0.695 
23 24 100 230 0.0022 0.035 0.1805 
44 45 100 230 0.0025 0.073 0 
40 48 100 230 0.002 0.022 0.64 
48 47 100 230 0.0025 0.0268 0.2 
48 47 100 230 0.0025 0.0268 0.2 
47 53 100 230 0.0013 0.0188 0.655 
31 53 100 230 0.0016 0.0163 0.125 
60 61 100 230 0.0023 0.0363 0.1902 
53 54 100 230 0.0035 0.0411 0.34935 
53 27 100 230 0.032 0.32 0.205 
18 49 100 230 0.0038 0.05705 1.16 
21 22 100 230 0.0008 0.014 0.12825 
68 37 100 230 0.0007 0.0089 0.0671 
17 36 100 230 0.0005 0.0045 0.16 
1 54 100 20 0 0.0181 0 
11 32 100 20 0 0.013 0 
12 36 100 20 0 0.0075 0 
13 17 200 20 0 0.00165 0 
14 41 100 20 0 0.0015 0 
15 42 100 20 0 0.0015 0 
16 18 100 20 0 0.003 0 
20 19 100 100 0.0007 0.0138 0 
35 34 100 230 0.0001 0.0074 0 
65 64 100 230 0.0016 0.0435 0 
2 58 100 20 0 0.025 0 
63 64 100 230 0.0016 0.0435 0 
3 62 100 20 0 0.02 0 
4 19 100 20 0.0007 0.0142 0 
5 20 100 20 0.0009 0.018 0 
6 22 100 20 0 0.0143 0 
8 25 100 20 0.0006 0.0232 0 
Table A.2: IEEE 68-bus system line data. (continued) 
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From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Rated 
MVA 
Rated 
KV 
Line 
Resistance 
Line 
Reactance 
Shunt 
Admittance 
8 25 100 20 0.0006 0.0232 0 
9 29 100 20 0.0008 0.0156 0 
10 31 100 20 0 0.026 0 
7 23 100 20 0.0005 0.0272 0 
Table A.2: IEEE 68-bus system line data. (continued) 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPANDED LOGIC AND PROCESS FLOW CHARTS 
 The flow charts below are expansions of the processes and logics that are 
described throughout the dissertation.  
Launch PSAT from MATLAB 
command window
Load global variables, initialize 
variables and function connections.
System model 
library
Select system model, set runtime, 
system frequency base.
Initialize TSA coefficient vectors, 
TSA.w1 = ∂x/∂α
TSA.w2 = ∂y/∂α
Initialized values are zero.
Solve power flow solution, use power 
flow solution to set-up dynamic 
conditions at t=0 (Figure B.2)
Calculate x(t), y(t), ∂F/∂x, ∂F/∂y, ∂G/
∂x, ∂G/∂y, populate power system 
DAE terms
t=0, extract rows and columns 
associated with α, then populate TSA 
DAE terms
 x(t), y(t), 
∂F/∂x, ∂F/∂y, 
∂G/∂x, ∂G/∂y
Determine ∆t size if not fixed
Set up Forward Euler solution 
equation, calculate error (Figure B.3)
Error < tolerance?
No
Save x(t), y(t), ∆t, updated t, and expand 
vector lengths to cover potential maximum 
number of time steps
Yes
Set up Forward Euler solution 
equation, calculate error (Figure B.4)
Error < tolerance?
No
Save TSA.w1, TSA.w2, and expand 
vector lengths to cover potential 
maximum number of time steps
Yes
t > t_final?
No
Simulation complete, stop routines
 
Figure B.1: Overall time domain simulation algorithm details. 
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Set-up power flow solution with network topology 
and power flow equations:
Model loaded, simulation 
conditions set (Figure B.1)
/ / | |
/ / | | | |
P P P V
Q Q Q V V
d d
d
∆ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∆     
=     ∆ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∆     
Initial guesses 
for δ(0), |V(0)| 
Evaluate Jacobian matrix 
based on existing values 
Solve for ∆δ and ∆|V| errors using
[∆δ; ∆|V|] = [J]-1 [∆P; ∆Q]
Update variables:
 [δ(k+1); |V(k+1)|] =  [δ(k); |V(k)|]+[∆δ; ∆|V|]
Power flow complete, insert power flow 
values into appropriate state variable 
equations. At t=0, 
F(x(0),y(0),α(0),0) =0 
G(x(0),y(0),α(0),0) =0 
Solve for x(0)
Check if ∆δ and ∆|V| errors are 
smaller than specified tolerance
No
Load state variable equations 
from PSAT library for 
F(x,y,α,t) and G(x,y,α,t)
Yes
Return to main time-domain 
solution (Figure B.1)  
Figure B.2: Power flow and time-domain simulation initialization algorithm details. 
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Model loaded, simulation initialized 
(Figures B.1, B.2)
x(t-) is the solution of the previous step
Solve for ∆x and ∆y errors using
[∆x; ∆y] = [DAE.Ac]-1 [DAE.tn; DAE.g]
Update variables:
 [x(k+1); y(k+1)] =  [x(k); y(k)]+[∆x; ∆y]
Update x and y vectors for the current 
time step
Update time t=t+∆t
Update outputs x, y
Check if ∆x and ∆y errors are 
smaller than specified tolerance
No
Yes
Return to main time-domain solution to 
continue to next time-step (Figure B.1)
Evaluate f and g using
DAE.g = G(x(t-),y(t-),α(t-),t-)
DAE.f = F(x(t-),y(t-),α(t-),t-)
Evaluate Jacobian terms ∂F/∂x, ∂F/∂y, ∂G/∂x, ∂G/∂y
Set-up DAE iterative solution equations:
/ /
.
/ /
. ( ) ( ) .
I t F x t F y
DAE Ac
G x G y
DAE tn x t x t t DAE f−
− ∆ ×∂ ∂ −∆ ×∂ ∂ 
=  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 = − −∆ × 
 
Figure B.3: Time-domain simulation Forward Euler integration algorithm details 
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Model loaded, time domain solved (Figures 
B.1, B.2, B.3)
(t-) denotes the solution of the previous step
Solve for ∆x and ∆y errors using
[∆TSA.w1; ∆TSA.w2] = [SAc]-1 [Stn; G’]
Update variables:
 [TSA.w1(k+1);TSA.w2(k+1)] =  [TSA.w1(k); TSA.w2(k)]+[∆TSA.w1; ∆TSA.w2]
Update TSA.w1 and TSA.w2 vectors for 
the current time step
Check if ∆TSA.w1 and ∆TSA.w2 errors are 
smaller than specified tolerance
No
Yes
Return to main time-domain solution to 
continue to next time-step (Figure B.1)
Evaluate TSA DAE terms using
w1_eval = ∂F/∂x(w1(t-))+∂F/∂y’(w2(t-))+∂F/∂α (t-)
w2_eval = ∂G’/∂x(w1(t-))+∂G’/∂y’(w2(t-))+∂G’/∂α (t-)
Extract terms associated with α. In this simulation α is 
chosen to always be a member of y.
 ∂F/∂x is unchanged 
∂F/∂y → ∂F/∂y’,  ∂F/∂α
∂G/∂x → ∂G’/∂x,  ∂G’/∂α
∂G/∂y → ∂G’/∂y’,  ∂G’/∂α
Set-up DAE iterative solution equations:
/ / '
'/ '/ '
. 1( ) . 1( ) 1_
I t F x t F y
SAc
G x G y
Stn TSA w t TSA w t t w eval−
− ∆ ×∂ ∂ −∆ ×∂ ∂ 
=  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 = − −∆ × 
 
Figure B.4: TSA calculation Forward Euler integration algorithm details 
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Select disturbance case for analysis (Line trip 
between bus 60-61 in this case)
Select α by changing the “alphaloc” variable in 
the TSA integration routine (Figure B.4)
List of available 
choices for α 
Run PSAT time-domain simulation with 
disturbance and solve for TSA coefficients 
(Figures B.1 through B.4)
Analyze TSA coefficients. 
Step 1: review maximum magnitudes 
max{|TSA.w1|} and max{|TSA.w2|}.
Select the coefficients with the 
maximum magnitudes above 0.05.
Select the coefficients with shapes 
consistent with Types 2, 3, or 4 from 
Table 3.2
Save list of coefficients with type, 
plots of coefficients and magnitudes.
Last choice for α?
No
Yes
Save results to determine the special 
protection scheme
 
Figure B.5: Usage of TSA coefficients in special protection scheme set-up 
100 
 
List of most sensitive 
variables
Run TSA Analysis for 
Disturbance Cases (Figure B.5)
List of available 
corrective actions.
APPLY CORRECTIVE 
ACTION, 
BLOCK OUT-OF-STEP
No
BLOCK CORRECTIVE 
ACTION, 
APPLY OUT-OF-STEP
Yes
PSAT Simulation
(Figure B.1)
State Variables
Calculate apparent impedance
Zapp falls inside of protection 
zone?
No, next time step
Check ∂x/∂α and ∂y/∂α associated with disturbance. 
For example, out-of-step condition will focus on bus 
voltages and angles at either end of the line. (|V| and θ) 
Yes
Corrective action interfer with 
conventional protection?
x(t)+(∂x/∂α)∆α →x(0)?
y(t)+(∂y/∂α)∆α →y(0)?
Yes
∆α 
α, ∂x/∂α, ∂y/∂α
No, next choice of α 
 
Figure B.6: Expanded trip and block logic for special protection scheme 
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